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ABSTRACT 
 
The informal economy remains understudied and a misunderstood phenomenon. This 
dissertation examines entrepreneurship in the informal economy by drawing upon a variety of 
theories in management research to examine antecedents that may explain and predict the 
entrepreneur’s likelihood of transitioning out of the informal economy. Using data from a unique 
government survey of an urban slum in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, empirical findings suggest that 
examining micro- and firm-level differences between entrepreneurs may inform the field’s 
traditional macro-level theorizing on the informal economy. Implications for policymakers and 
management research along with potential avenues for future research are discussed.      
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
  
The informal economy is defined as economic activity that takes place outside of 
government regulation and oversight and represents a significant portion of the world economy 
(Godfrey, 2015; Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009). Current estimates suggest that the 
informal economy produces as much as 60 to 70 % of GDP in many less developed economies 
and between 10 to 20% in developed economies (Schneider 2002, 2005). The significant 
imbalance of informal economy activity in less developed economies relative to developed 
economies is due to higher levels of institutional voids, “situations where institutional 
arrangements that support markets are absent, weak, or fail to accomplish the role expected of 
them” (Mair & Marti, 2009: 419). However, within countries there exists significant variance in 
the level of institutional voids and where informal economic activity takes place.  For example, 
many locations in the developing world are plagued by extreme poverty where institutional voids 
are even more pronounced (Bruton, 2010; Hulme & Shepherd, 2003; Pearce, 2005; Prahalad, 
2005; Prahalad & Hart, 2002; Seelos & Mair, 2007, United Nations, 2010). Consequently, the 
informal economy is even more prevalent in impoverished settings (Bruton, 2010; De Soto, 
1989, 2000).  
Research on the informal economy has long explored the rise of the informal economy 
(Castells & Portes, 1989; De Soto, 1989, 2000; Godfrey, 2011, 2015; International Labour 
Office, 2002; Lewis 1954/1958; Polanyi, 1957; Wallerstein, 1974/2007) and has generally 
focused on the quality of formal institutions (e.g., governments) and regulations to predict 
informal activity. For example, high registration fees, high legal bureaucracy, and the absence of 
property rights protection have been shown to increase informal economic activity (Besley & 
Burgess, 2004; De Soto, 2000; La Porta & Schleifer, 2008; Marcouiller & Young, 1995; 
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Nwabuzor, 2005; Thomas & Mueller, 2000; Zinnes, 2009). Research in the economics literature 
has examined the relationship between economic factors such as capital and labor and the overall 
structure of the economy to explain the informal economy, levels of economic development, and 
impoverished settings (Maloney, 1999; Wallerstein, 2007).  Other research in sociology has 
considered the social structure of communities such as ethnic enclaves and immigrant 
communities to explain informal activity (Ahmad, 2008; Geertz; 1963; Nyssens, 2006; Peredo & 
Chrisman, 2006; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Venkatesh, 2006).   
A common theme throughout much of the extant literature on the informal economy is a 
focus on how elements at the macro- and meta-level of analysis (e.g., community, industry, 
country levels) are instrumental in predicating informal activity. Yet, despite this impressive 
body of work, there is little research that explores how the strategic behavior and attributes of 
entrepreneurs at a more micro-level prompt and support informal activity and more importantly 
how they influence the entrepreneur’s exit out of the informal economy and into the formal 
economy (Skousen & Mahoney, 2015). Exiting the informal economy has important implications 
for poverty reduction as the formal economy can provide better access to institutions that 
facilitate the accumulation of resources and growth. Thus, scholars and public policymakers 
often suggest that the solution to the informal economy and poverty resides in improving the 
quality of institutions. However, Godfrey (2011) notes that “the easily invoked (but 
fundamentally incorrect) notion of weak institutions provides an overly simplistic solution to a 
complex problem. In reality, the (informal) institutions (i.e., values and norms) supporting and 
sustaining poverty and the informal economy prove remarkably robust, strong, and able to resist 
change and reform” (Godfrey, 2011: 266; Mair, Marti, & Ventresca, 2012). This reality points 
toward the need for more management research that examines the interaction between formal 
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and informal institutions on entrepreneurship (Godfrey & Dyer, 2015; Peredo & McLean, 2013; 
Sine & David, 2010) in the context of the informal economy (Bruton, 2010; Bruton, Ketchen, & 
Ireland, 2013; Hart, 1973; Peng & Heath, 1996; Webb, Bruton, Tihanyi, & Ireland, 2013; Webb 
& Ireland, 2015). 
Management scholars have recently begun to recognize that the informal economy is an 
important and understudied phenomenon and that management scholars are well positioned to 
contribute to this body of research (Bruton, 2010; Bruton, Ireland, & Ketchen, 2012; Godfrey, 
2011, 2015; London & Hart, 2011; McGahan, 2012; Prahalad, 2005; Webb et al., 2009a, Webb 
et al., 2013). Yet, despite increasing interest and calls for management scholars to study the 
informal economy, little is known about how individual and firm-level characteristics may 
prompt entrepreneurs to exit the informal economy. This dissertation seeks to examine these 
questions by drawing upon research on institutions and entrepreneurship (e.g., the interaction of 
formal and informal institutions) and a variety of other streams of literature, including 
entrepreneurship research on motivation, human capital, logic from transaction cost economics, 
institutional theory, and family business research. 
As noted above, the informal economy tends to be most prevalent in institutional 
environments characterized by high levels of institutional voids. Institutions establish “the rules 
of the game” and thereby define what is acceptable within a society (North, 1990: 3).  
Institutions can be broadly classified into formal and informal institutions (North, 1990). Formal 
institutions are regulations and laws that are codified and enforced, often by the state, and 
establish the boundaries of what is legal (Suchman, Steward, & Westfall, 2001). More recently, 
formal institutions have been conceptualized broadly to include supporting apparatuses such as 
capital/labor markets, education, health care, utilities, and infrastructure (Khanna & Palepu, 
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1997; Mair & Marti, 2009). In contrast, informal institutions are beliefs, values and norms that 
establish what are socially accepted and expected patterns of behavior (Aldrich & Baker, 2001; 
Suchman et al., 2001).  
The combination of formal and informal institutions within a well-defined space (e.g., 
country, region, city, community, group, etc.) creates an institutional environment that leads to 
an institutional logic where there is shared meaning that provides coherence to social life and 
expectations about social behavior (Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008; Scott, 2008; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). Institutional environments vary in their 
support for entrepreneurial activity and specific types of entrepreneurship (Terjesen, Hessels, & 
Li, 2013) as formal and informal institutions may converge or diverge in their support (or lack of 
support) for different types of entrepreneurship (Eberhart, Eesley, Cheng, & Skousen, 2015).  
One notable outcome of when formal and informal institutions diverge is the informal economy 
(Webb, et al., 2009a).  
The informal economy represents a situation where informal institutions are largely 
supportive of entrepreneurial activity but formal institutions either consider such activity illegal 
and/or do not provide adequate support or access to resources that facilitate growth due to weak 
or insecure institutions (low quality) or incomplete or absent institutions (institutional voids) 
(Godfrey, 2011).  As a consequence, entrepreneurship in areas that are high in institutional voids 
often occurs in institutional environments that can be classified as informal institutional 
environments. Informal institutional environments are defined as institutional environments (the 
combination of formal and informal institutions within a well-defined space) where economic 
activity is largely governed by informal institutions that are supportive of the informal economy 
and consider informal economic activity as an acceptable or legitimate form of economic activity 
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and where formal institutions are relatively absent (i.e., high institutional voids). On the other 
hand formal institutional environments are institutional environments where economic activity is 
largely governed by informal institutions that are not supportive of the informal economy and 
consider informal economic activity as an unacceptable or illegitimate form of economic activity 
and where formal institutions are influential and well-functioning.  
Figure 1.1 provides a taxonomy of economic activity based on whether the activity 
occurs in formal or informal institutional environments and on whether or not such activity is 
considered part of the informal economy. Accordingly economic activity can be categorized into 
four-distinct outcomes or quadrants. Quadrant 1 depicts economic activity that is part of the 
informal economy and occurs in an informal institutional environment. Quadrant 2 depicts 
economic activity that is part of the formal economy but takes place in an informal institutional 
environment that is supportive of the informal economy. Quadrants 3 depicts economic activity 
that is part of the informal economy but takes place where informal institutions do not support 
the informal economy and formal institutions are influential and well-functioning.  Lastly, 
quadrant 4 depicts economic activity that is part of the formal economy and takes place where 
informal institutions do not support the informal economy and formal institutions are influential 
and well-functioning.  
In the remaining dissertation chapters I seek to examine how the attributes and strategic 
behavior of entrepreneurs operating in informal institutional environments may influence the 
entrepreneur’s likelihood of exiting the informal economy. Chapter 2 aims to provide a greater 
understanding of entrepreneurship in informal institutional environments (Quadrants 1 and 2) by 
examining how entrepreneurship in this context may differ from entrepreneurship in more formal 
institutional contexts  Chapter 3 examines factors that help to explain and predict which 
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entrepreneurs are likely to cross institutional boundaries. Crossing institutional boundaries leads 
to institutional pluralism and conflicting pressures from formal and informal institutions and may 
be an important antecedent to exiting the informal economy. Specifically, Chapter 3 considers 
entrepreneurs that are operating in an informal institutional environment (quadrants 1 and 2) and 
whether or not they cross into a formal institutional environment (quadrants 3 and 4).  Chapter 4 
examines factors that help to explain and predict which entrepreneurs are likely to exit the 
informal economy through registration. Specifically, this chapter examines the differences 
between entrepreneurs in quadrants 1 and 2. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 summarize the main research 
questions and each provides a figure to illustrate the phenomenon under examination. Lastly, 
Chapter 5 provides a discussion and conclusion on the findings and contributions and offers 
potential avenues for future research.  
The data used in this dissertation derive from a community survey of entrepreneurs in an 
informal institutional environment, an urban slum, called Manguinhos in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. I 
also use survey data on a second urban slum called Rocinha for robustness checks. Figure 1.4 
provides a map of Rio de Janeiro. Areas marked in red represent urban slums. Evident from this 
map is that urban slums are prevalent across the city. The survey was performed by a third party 
administrator on behalf of the state government of Rio de Janeiro to assist in identifying and 
evaluating the entire population of entrepreneurs in the community. The survey was administered 
door by door by trained employees during the period July 2008 to April 2009. A total of 2,833 
entrepreneurs were identified.  Of this total, 57 refused to participate in the survey and 61 were 
unable to be contacted. For those entrepreneurs that were unable to be contacted, survey 
administrators made an attempt to visit them on three different occasions on different days and 
times in an effort to have them participate in the survey.  The total number of entrepreneurs that 
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completed the survey was 2,715 representing 95.8% of the total population of entrepreneurs 
identified. The responses were analyzed and subsequently verified in the field on approximately 
20% of the respondents to ensure validity. For purposes of this study, businesses that were 
associated with the government or operated as a not-for-profit (a total of 98 businesses) were 
excluded resulting in an available sample size of 2,617.  
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FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 1 
 
Figure 1.1 Taxonomy of Economic Activity  
 
 
 
 
Outline of Dissertation Chapters Related to Figure 1.1:  
Chapter 2: Examines entrepreneurship in quadrants 1 and 2 
Chapter 3: Examines which entrepreneurs in quadrants 1 and 2 are more likely to cross into 
formal institutional environments represented by quadrants 3 and 4.  
Chapter 4: Examines the differences between entrepreneurs in quadrants 1 and 2 
Chapter 5: Provides a discussion of results and avenues for future research. It also seeks to 
explain how the empirical findings may inform entrepreneurship in quadrant 3.   
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Figure 1.2: Research Question #1 
Research Question #1: What factors help to explain and predict which entrepreneurs who are 
operating in informal institutional environments are likely to cross institutional boundaries into a 
formal institutional environment? 
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Figure 1.3: Research Question #2 
Research Question #2: What factors help to explain and predict which entrepreneurs who are 
operating in informal institutional environments are likely to exit the informal economy through 
registration? 
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Figure 1.4: Map of Rio de Janeiro 
 
Source: Secretaria Municipal de Habitação (Municipal Department of Housing) 
Note 1: Areas marked in red are urban slums. 
Note 2: Data used in this dissertation are from Manguinhos and Rocinha  
 
 
 
12 
 
CHAPTER 2: 
Understanding Entrepreneurship in Informal Institutional Environments 
 
Participation in Entrepreneurship 
Identifying who participates in entrepreneurship is a first critical step in understanding 
entrepreneurial activity in informal institutional environments. As noted in figure 1.4, informal 
institutional environments are prevalent phenomenon. Based on the survey data it is estimated 
that there are 27,073 residents in Manguinhos where 47.3% are male and 52.7% are female. 
Extant research on gender and entrepreneurship suggests that females tend to lag behind male 
entrepreneurs in starting, owning, and operating businesses based on data in more formal 
institutional environments (Bruin, Brush, & Welter, 2006; Minniti, Arenius, & Langowitz, 2005; 
Reynolds & Curtin, 2008).  Interestingly, in Manguinhos, females comprise the majority (55%) 
of the total sample (1,444) / 2,617) of individuals who choose to become entrepreneurs. When 
considering the total population in the community, entrepreneurship rates by gender tend to be 
similar (Males = 9% and Females = 10%). This increase in female entrepreneurship in informal 
institutional environments relative to formal institutional environments may be influenced by 
general findings which suggest that female entrepreneurs in the informal economy tend to 
operate at lower levels of organization and scale, and do not have a formal space to operate 
compared to male entrepreneurs (Fernandez-Kelly & Garcia, 1991; Webb et al., 2013; Williams 
& Gurtoo, 2011). These general findings suggest that entrepreneurial entry for females may be 
higher in informal institutional settings compared to more formal institutional settings. These 
general findings appear to be consistent with those in Manguinhos as only 25% of female 
entrepreneurs operate in a storefront property compared to 50% of male entrepreneurs. This 
difference is statistically significant (p < .001) and suggests that female entrepreneurs have a 
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greater propensity to be street vendors and base their business operations out of their own homes. 
Table 2.1 provides t-statistics on gender differences.  
The distribution of entrepreneurs by gender and age is presented in Figure 2.1. The 
average age of entrepreneurs is 41 years old whereas the average age of an individual in 
Manguinhos is 27 years and roughly 75% of the population is under the age of 40. Males and 
females of all age groups participate in entrepreneurship. The number of entrepreneurs for both 
males and females tends to follow a bell curve skewed to the right that peaks between the age of 
35 and 44.  Figure 2.2 presents the distribution by percentage of entrepreneurs of the same 
gender. This graph indicates that female entrepreneurs tend to have a greater propensity to 
become entrepreneurs at an earlier age.  In the earliest age groups (17 – 24 and 25 – 34) females 
exhibit a greater percentage of entrepreneurs of the same gender. This trend shifts in subsequent 
age groups. Gender differences by age are statistically significant up to age 55 (see Table 2.1) 
suggesting that males and females have different propensities to engage in entrepreneurship at 
different ages. To further examine gender differences, Figure 2.3 provides the percentage of 
gender composition by age group. Similarly, a clear pattern emerges as entrepreneurs in the two 
youngest age groups of 17 – 24 and 25 – 34 are disproportionally composed of females, 67% and 
59% respectively. The composition of gender by age groups 35 – 44 and 45 – 54 is roughly 50% 
for each gender and begins to rise again for female entrepreneurs over 55 years of age.  
 
Educational, Employment, Industry and Start-up Experience  
Human capital refers to “the skills and knowledge that individuals acquire through 
investment in schooling, on-the-job training, and other types of experience” (Unger, Rauch, 
Frese, & Rosenbusch, 2011: 343) and has been shown to highly influence the entrepreneurship 
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process (Shane, 2000). Human capital theory (e.g., Becker, 1962, 1964; Schultz, 1961) posits 
that entrepreneurs who have a greater stock of knowledge will have greater cognitive ability, 
which will lead to more productive and efficient activity (Block & Sandner, 2009).  The 
entrepreneur’s level of human capital is particularly important in informal institutional 
environments as higher levels of human capital can help the entrepreneur navigate high levels of 
institutional voids. Higher levels of human capital can also lead to better sense making of 
institutional ambiguity between legal rules and enforcement capabilities by government agencies 
(Skousen & Mahoney, 2015). Furthermore, human capital has been shown to be a salient 
predictor of an entrepreneur’s willingness to engage with surroundings, to search for new 
products or vendors, and transact with unfamiliar exchange partners (Kintgen, Kroll, & Rose, 
1988; London, Esper, Grogan-Kaylor, & Kistruck, 2014; Rosa & Viswanathan, 2007).   
In this section the entrepreneur’s level of human capital is examined across the following 
four dimensions that have been established measures of human capital (Cooper, Gimeno, & 
Woo, 1994; Delmar & Shane, 2006; Evans & Leighton, 1989; Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 
1997; Shane, 2000): 
 Educational Attainment 
 Employment Experience 
 Industry Experience 
 Start-up Experience 
Educational Attainment 
Figure 2.4 provides the educational attainment of entrepreneurs by gender.  Research on 
gender commonly posits that female entrepreneurs tend to have less institutional support 
(whether actual or perceived) from both formal and informal institutions for entrepreneurial 
activity (Acs, Bardasi, Estrin, & Svejnar, 2011; Baughn, Chua, & Neupert, 2006; Jennings & 
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Brush, 2013). Access to education is one important form of institutional support. Interestingly, 
variation in the entrepreneur’s educational attainment does not appear to vary by gender as the t-
statistic is insignificant (See Table 2.1). While statistical differences in educational attainment by 
gender do not manifest, the vast majority of entrepreneurs do not complete the equivalent of a 
high school education (85%) and 64% do not complete a primary-level school.  Only 3% of 
entrepreneurs pursue further education past the equivalent of high school. These trends tend to be 
consistent with non-entrepreneurs in the community as the average individual did not complete 
primary school. Only 11% of residents have completed the equivalent of high school and 3% 
pursued education past high school.   
Figure 2.5 provides educational attainment by age. While educational attainment remains 
low for both males and female entrepreneurs, figure 2.5 illustrates a strong pattern of 
improvement in younger age groups. For example, an incomplete primary education was as high 
as 86% for entrepreneurs between 65 – 74 and dropped to 47% for entrepreneurs between 17 – 
24. Unfortunately, education beyond primary education appears to be achieving less 
improvement as younger age groups are not pursing higher levels of education (i.e., high school 
and beyond) which may have a bigger impact on the quality and type of entrepreneurship.    
Employment and Industry Experience 
Prior work experience has been shown to be associated with how an individual identifies 
an entrepreneurial opportunity and how he/she subsequently exploits that entrepreneurial 
opportunity (Shane, 2000). Figure 2.6 illustrates what the entrepreneur did before starting the 
business. Based on the information in figure 2.6 industry experience can be classified as 
entrepreneurs that were “employed in same area,” “had a business in same area,” or “always 
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worked in this manner” and are provided in figure 2.7. Based on this categorization, only 23% of 
the sample had some form of industry experience and males tend to have more industry 
experience (28%) relative to females (18%) (p<.001). Interestingly, the majority of entrepreneurs 
(56%) were employed in an area unrelated to the business they started and 14% were employed 
within the same area. This phenomenon is in stark contrast to recent findings of representative 
samples in the USA that suggest that roughly 75% of entrepreneurs engaged in start-ups have 
previous industry experience (Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). Research on industry experience in 
more formal institutional environments suggests that entrepreneurs with industry experience 
have greater survival rates (e.g., Delmar & Shane, 2006). Figure 2.8 illustrates that males are 
more likely to enter entrepreneurship from employment from either the same or different areas 
compared to females (p < .001) (See Table 2.1). Similar to industry experience, males tend to 
have a greater tendency to enter entrepreneurship from previous employment as 82% of males 
had employment experience compared to 61% for females (p < .001) (Figure 3.5). It is important 
to note here that the entrepreneur may have been unemployed at the time of entrepreneurial entry 
(as noted in section 4.0 on motivation) but this variable captures what the entrepreneur did before 
becoming an entrepreneur.  
 
Start-up Experience 
Previous experience as an entrepreneur is provided in figure 2.9. About 90% of 
entrepreneurs in Manguinhos had no previous experience starting or managing a business with a 
statistically significant difference between males and females (p< .05). Only 8% of female 
entrepreneurs and 11% of male entrepreneurs had previous start-up experience. The proportion 
of entrepreneurs without prior start-up experience is substantially higher than in formal 
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institutional environments where roughly 60% of entrepreneurs had no start-up experience, as 
captured by representative samples in the USA (Reynolds & Curtin, 2008).   
Motivation  
Research on an entrepreneur’s start-up motivation distinguishes between necessity and 
opportunity-driven entrepreneurship, also referred to as push and pull factors for starting a business 
(Kirkwood, 2009; Schjoedt & Shaver, 2007). Research has shown that motivations for starting a 
business tend to influence how entrepreneurs navigate the entrepreneurship process (Shane, Locke, 
& Collins, 2003). Necessity-based entrepreneurship refers to the conflict between one’s current 
and one’s desired occupational status that may push an individual into starting a business when 
other alternatives to achieve an individual’s desired outcomes are unavailable.  Opportunity-based 
entrepreneurship refers to the entrepreneur’s expectation of potential rewards and being better off 
by starting a business compared to being employed by someone else.  
Figure 2.10 provides the entrepreneur’s motivation for starting a business by gender. For 
both males (58%) and females (63%) the primary motivation for starting their business was 
because they were unemployed.  Important gender differences are evident in the other motivation 
categories. Males tend to be more driven by autonomy and opportunity and less to increase family 
income relative to women. Consistent with prior literature the categorizations in figure 2.10 can 
be classified into necessity and opportunity-driven entrepreneurship. Necessity-based 
entrepreneurship included “unemployed” and “other” reasons that were consistent with push 
factors. Opportunity-driven entrepreneurship included “autonomy,” ‘opportunity emerged” and to 
“increase family income”. Following this categorization, males and females exhibit statistically 
different motivations (p < .01) where 40% of males were driven by opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurship compared to 34% for women as shown in figure 2.11. In chapters 3 and 4 
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opportunity-driven entrepreneurship is further broken down to consider an important sub-category 
of opportunity-driven entrepreneurship referred to as improvement-driven entrepreneurship.    
Family Business 
Family business is a common form of ownership in informal institutional environments 
as 35% of the businesses were identified as a family business. In the context of the informal 
economy it is not possible to define a family business on legal ownership agreements as is 
generally done in family business research in the formal economy (Khavul, Bruton, & Wood, 
2009).  In this study a family business is defined as a business that is owned solely by family 
members or in the case where there is only one owner the owner employs family members and 
considers the firm to be a family business.   
Figure 2.12 provides the percentage of family businesses by gender. Surprisingly, males 
have a slightly higher tendency (39%) to operate as family businesses compared to females 
(32%) and the difference is statistically different (p < .001) (See Table 2.2).  The remainder of 
this section examines whether entrepreneurs who operate as a family business vary in their 
human capital and motivations.  Figure 2.13 illustrates that family and non-family businesses are 
not statistically different from each other in educational attainment.  Figures 2.14 and 2.15 
illustrate that family businesses tend to have more industry experience (p < .05) and less 
employment experience (p < .10). Figure 2.16 and 2.17 indicate that family businesses do not 
vary in their previous start-up experience and motivation for starting a business as no statistical 
differences were identified.    
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The Informal Economy 
Only a small percentage of entrepreneurs in Manguinhos, represented by quadrant 2 in 
figure 1.1 are considered part of the formal economy based on their registration status with the 
government. Registering with the government has important implications for transitioning out of 
poverty as formality may provide an entrepreneur with access to resources and other resources 
that facilitate growth. Figure 2.18 provides the formality of the entrepreneur by gender where 
formal means the entrepreneur is registered with the government and informal means the 
entrepreneur is not registered with the government. Males comprise roughly 2/3rds of (67%) of 
the entrepreneurs that are legally registered. In figure 2.19 educational attainment by formality is 
provided. Entrepreneurs that are registered are statistically different in their educational 
attainment (p < .001) from those that are unregistered (See Table 2.3). Figure 2.19 indicates that 
roughly 50% of formal entrepreneurs completed high school compared to only 14% of informal 
entrepreneurs.  
In figure 2.20 industry experience is statistically associated with formality (p < .001) as 
roughly half (45%) of formal entrepreneurs had industry experience whereas only 22% of 
informal entrepreneurs had industry experience.  In figure 2.21 no statistical difference in 
employment experience was found between formal and informal entrepreneurs. Figure 2.22 
indicates that the majority of formal entrepreneurs are not serial entrepreneurs but they do exhibit 
a higher portion (20%) of formal entrepreneurs relative to informal firms (9%) and is statistically 
significant (p < .001). Figure 2.23 provides the relationship between motivation for starting their 
business and formality. Entrepreneurs who operate formally are primarily driven by opportunity 
(68%) whereas informal entrepreneurs are primarily driven by necessity (64%) and are 
statistically different (p < .001).  Lastly, Figure 2.24 illustrates the relationship between formality 
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and family businesses and is statistically significant (p < .01). Family businesses comprise 
roughly 50% of formal firms while only 34% of informal firms are family businesses.  
Crossing Institutional Boundaries 
The interaction between institutional environments may be an important antecedent to 
exiting the informal economy (Skousen & Mahoney, 2015). Yet, what remains unexamined is 
our understanding of the antecedents that influence whether or not entrepreneurs who are 
operating in informal institutional environments (quadrants 1 and 2) will venture outside their 
informal institutional environment by crossing institutional boundaries into more formal 
institutional environments (quadrants 3 and 4). Crossing institutional boundaries influences the 
entrepreneur’s ability to identify, evaluate, and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities which has 
important implications for transitioning out of the informal economy (Bruton et al., 2013; 
Ketchen, Ireland, & Webb, 2014). 
Figure 2.25 illustrates crossing institutional boundaries for clients and suppliers by 
formality. Formality is statistically associated with both crossing for clients and for suppliers at p 
< .001 suggesting that formal entrepreneurs in quadrant 2 are more likely to cross institutional 
boundaries as they may encounter less normative friction from competing institutions.  Figure 
2.26 indicates that gender is associated with crossing institutional boundaries at p < .001 for both 
clients and suppliers. Males tend to have a greater propensity to go beyond adjacent 
neighborhoods bordering Manguinhos. Figure 2.27 illustrates the relationship between 
motivation and crossing institutional boundaries. Only crossing institutional boundaries for 
suppliers was statistically significant (p < .001) (See Table 2.4), suggesting that entrepreneurs 
motivated by opportunity tend to be more likely to cross institutional boundaries for suppliers 
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relative to those motivated by necessity. Figure 2.28 indicates that crossing institutional 
boundaries for both clients and suppliers increases as educational attainment increases. Figure 
2.29 illustrates the relationship between family businesses and crossing institutional boundaries 
and finds a statistical difference for both groups at p < .001. However, as figure 2.29 illustrates, 
family businesses tend to be have a greater propensity to cross institutional boundaries for 
suppliers but exhibit lower levels for clients relative to non-family businesses. 
Industry of Entrepreneur 
Distinguishing between industry and characteristics of the entrepreneur and his/her 
business illustrates some interesting trends. Figure 2.30 provides industry by formality and 
suggests that formality is highly influenced by which industry the entrepreneur operates in (See 
Table 2.5). For example, over half (61%) of formal businesses operate grocery stores, general 
retail or provide general services. Very few entrepreneurs in industries such as domestic services, 
seamstress services, handicrafts, general contractors or confectioners register their businesses. 
Figure 2.31 provides industry by gender. The industry an entrepreneur operates in appears to be 
highly influenced by gender as there are statistically significant differences for all industries 
except professional services (See Table 2.6). For example, females are not represented in taxi 
services or contractors while males are generally not involved in domestic services, seamstress 
services or handicrafts.  Figure 2.33 illustrates industry by family. Operating as a family business 
also strongly influences which industry the entrepreneur operates in as statistical differences are 
evident across industries except for professional services and taxi services (See Table 2.7). Most 
notable is that family businesses tend to work in the food industry as family businesses have a 
disproportionate share of entrepreneurs in Bar/Snack Bar and grocery store categories.  Figure 
2.32 illustrates industry by motivation for starting a business. Motivation appears to have a 
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weaker association than formality, gender, and operating as a family business (See Table 2.8). 
Entrepreneurs driven by necessity appear to have a strong relationship with domestic services 
while those driven by opportunity have a strong relationship with general services and retail.   
Discussion and Conclusion 
The purpose of this dissertation chapter was to examine entrepreneurship in informal 
institutional environments. A number of interesting trends emerged that have important theory 
and research implications. The first concerns the antecedents to entrepreneurship.  
Entrepreneurship research has a long history of examining who becomes an entrepreneur and 
how they identify opportunities (e.g., Carland, Hoy, & Carland, 1988; Kirzner, 1973; 
Schumpeter, 1976; Shane, 2000; Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005; Singh, Hills, Hybels, & Lumpkin, 
1999); however, this research stream has not adequately considered these questions in informal 
institutional environments (Bruton, et al., 2013). Two notable differences identified here are the 
entrepreneur’s motivation and human capital. First, findings presented in this chapter indicate 
that entrepreneurial motivation in informal institutional environments is quite heterogeneous in 
nature. To date, entrepreneurship research has not addressed how motivations for starting a 
business influence the strategic behavior of entrepreneurs in informal institutional environments.  
Second, human capital is an important antecedent to entrepreneurial entry and outcomes but the 
general tendencies identified in this chapter suggest that human capital may have fundamentally 
different effects than in more formal institutional contexts. For example, what does the role of 
industry experience play in opportunity identification and exploitation? Interestingly, 
entrepreneurs in Manguinhos exhibit much lower levels of industry experience relative to 
entrepreneurs in more formal institutional contexts. As a consequence, how do entrepreneurs 
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operating in informal institutional environments leverage what they have learned to identify and 
subsequently exploit opportunities that are in different industries?  
 Entrepreneurs in Manguinhos also tend to exhibit lower levels of being serial 
entrepreneurs and a considerable amount of entrepreneurs (8%) have “always worked in the 
same manner” or in other words have no other experience beyond the business that they 
currently operate.  This reality raises interesting questions about research on entrepreneurial 
persistence (e.g., DeTiennee, Shepherd, & De Castro, 2008; Gimeno, et al., 1997; Holland & 
Shepherd, 2013). For example, what is the relationship with persistence and subsistence 
entrepreneurship? What is the relationship with persistence and entrepreneurs that attempt to 
grow in informal institutional environments? Do entrepreneurs that enter entrepreneurship out of 
necessity exit when employment opportunities become available or do they persist with their 
entrepreneurial venture? These questions have not been adequately addressed and future research 
would benefit from examining such questions.  
In the remaining chapters of this dissertation, I focus on examining entrepreneurs in 
informal institutional environments who exit the informal economy through registration and who 
interact with economic actors across institutional boundaries as outlined in figures 1.1, 1.2, and   
1.3. I examine these questions under the assumption that such behavior increases the 
entrepreneur’s ability to transform his/her business from a micro-organization that supports 
subsistence to one that generates surplus income and therefore has important implications for 
research on the informal economy and poverty (Bruton 2010; Godfrey, 2015; Skousen & 
Mahoney, 2015; Webb et al., 2009a). 
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FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 2 
Figure 2.1: Number of Entrepreneurs by Gender and Age 
 
Figure 2.2: Percentage of Entrepreneurs by Gender and Age 
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Figure 2.3: Percentage of Entrepreneurs within Age Group by Gender 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Percentage of Entrepreneurs by Educational Attainment and Gender 
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Figure 2.5: Educational Attainment by Age Group 
 
Figure 2.6: Previous Experience Prior to Entrepreneurship 
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Figure 2.7: Industry Experience by Gender 
  
 
Figure 2.8: Employment Experience by Gender 
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Figure 2.9: Prior Start-up Experience by Gender 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Start-up Motivation by Gender 
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Figure 2.11 Necessity and Opportunity Motivation by Gender 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Percentage of Family Businesses by Gender 
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Figure 2.13: Educational Attainment by Family Business 
 
 
Figure 2.14: Industry Experience by Family Business 
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Figure 2.15: Employment Experience by Family Business 
 
 
Figure 2.16: Serial Entrepreneur by Family Business 
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Figure 2.17: Necessity and Opportunity Motivation by Family Business 
 
Figure 2.18: Formality by Gender 
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Figure 2.19: Educational Attainment by Formality 
 
 
Figure 2.20: Industry Experience by Formality 
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Figure 2.21: Employment Experience by Formality 
 
 
Figure 2.22: Serial Entrepreneur by Formality 
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Figure 2.23: Necessity and Opportunity Motivation by Formality 
 
 
Figure 2.24: Percentage of Family Businesses by Formality 
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Figure 2.25: Crossing Instiutional Boundaries for Clients and Suppliers by Formality  
 
Figure 2.26: Crossing Institutional Boundaries for Clients and Suppliers by Gender
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Figure 2.27: Crossing Boundaries for Clients and  Suppliers by Necessity and Opportunity 
Motvation 
 
 
Figure 2.28: Crossing Institutional Boundaries for Clients and Suppliers by Educational 
Attainment 
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Figure 2.29: Crossing Institutional Boundaries for Clients and Suppliers by Family Business 
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Figure 2.30: Industry of the Entrepreneur by Formality 
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Figure 2.31: Industry of the Entrepreneur by Gender 
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Figure 2.32: Industry of the Entrepreneur by Necessity and Opportunity Motivation 
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Figure 2.33: Industry of the Entrepreneur by Family Business  
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Table 2.1: T-Statistics of Characteristics of the Entrepreneur by Gender 
 
Variable by T-Stat Pr> |t|   Observations 
Education  Gender -0.527 0.598   2556 
Formal Gender -4.748 0.000 *** 2617 
Storefront Gender -13.947 0.000 *** 2407 
Age Groups:           
  age17to24 Gender 3.867 0.000 *** 2617 
  age25to34 Gender 2.184 0.029 * 2617 
  age35to44 Gender -2.248 0.025 * 2617 
  age45to54 Gender -2.137 0.033 * 2617 
  age55to64 Gender -0.717 0.473   2617 
  age65to74 Gender 0.662 0.508   2617 
  age75Up Gender -0.240 0.810   2617 
education Gender -0.527 0.598   2556 
industry experience Gender -5.586 0.000 *** 2523 
employment experience Gender -11.798 0.000 *** 2523 
Serial Entrepreneur Gender -2.550 0.011 * 2493 
Motivation Gender -3.120 0.002 ** 2533 
 
Table 2.2: T-Statistics of Characteristics of the Entrepreneur by Family Business 
 
Variable by T-Stat Pr> |t|   Observations 
Gender Family -3.686 0.000 *** 2581 
Education Family 0.396 0.692   2521 
industry experience Family -2.330 0.020 * 2492 
employment experience Family 1.706 0.088 † 2492 
Serial Entrepreneur Family -1.434 0.152   2469 
Motivation Family -1.638 0.102   2503 
 
 
Table 2.3: T-Statistics of Characteristics of the Entrepreneur by Formality 
 
Variable by T-Stat Pr> |t|   Observations 
Gender formal -4.748 0.000 *** 2617 
Education formal -11.637 0.000 *** 2556 
industry experience formal -5.581 0.000 *** 2523 
employment experience formal 0.598 0.550   2523 
Serial Entrepreneur formal -3.745 0.000 *** 2493 
Motivation formal -6.607 0.000 *** 2533 
Family formal -2.870 0.004 ** 2581 
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Table 2.4: T-Statistics on Crossing Institutional Boundaries for Clients and Suppliers 
 
Crossing Institutional 
Boundaries by T-Stat Pr> |t|   Observations 
Clients Formal -10.340 0.000 *** 2559 
Clients Gender -3.901 0.000 *** 2559 
Clients Motivation -1.319 0.187   2483 
Clients Family 8.582 0.000 *** 2532 
            
Suppliers Formal -10.111 0.000 *** 2328 
Suppliers Gender -4.429 0.000 *** 2328 
Suppliers Motivation -5.636 0.000 *** 2263 
Suppliers Family -5.366 0.000 *** 2309 
 
 
Table 2.5: T-Statistics on Industry of Entrepreneur by Formality 
 
Industry by T-Stat Pr> |t|   Observations 
Taxi Services Formal -4.561 0.000 *** 2617 
Bar/Snack Bar Formal 2.495 0.013 * 2617 
Beauty Salon Formal 2.260 0.024 * 2617 
Confectioner Formal 3.191 0.001 ** 2617 
Contractor Formal 2.110 0.035 * 2617 
Domestic Services Formal 2.986 0.003 ** 2617 
Education/Classes Formal -7.711 0.000 *** 2617 
General Retail Formal -5.881 0.000 *** 2617 
General Services Formal -5.106 0.000 *** 2617 
Variety Store Formal 1.213 0.225   2617 
Grocery Store Formal -3.219 0.001 ** 2617 
Handicrafts Formal 1.647 0.100 † 2617 
Professional Services Formal -2.063 0.039 * 2617 
Seamstress Services Formal 2.476 0.013 * 2617 
Legend: † p <  0.10,  * p <  0.05, ** p <  0.01, ***p  <  0.001 
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Table 2.6: T-Statistics on Industry of Entrepreneur by Gender 
 
Industry by T-Stat Pr> |t|   Observations 
Taxi Services Gender -7.587 0.000 *** 2617 
Bar/Snack Bar Gender -5.872 0.000 *** 2617 
Beauty Salon Gender 9.331 0.000 *** 2617 
Confectioner Gender 6.438 0.000 *** 2617 
Contractor Gender -17.226 0.000 *** 2617 
Domestic Services Gender 14.511 0.000 *** 2617 
Education/Classes Gender 2.270 0.023 * 2617 
General Retail Gender -3.800 0.000 *** 2617 
General Services Gender -12.499 0.000 *** 2617 
Variety Store Gender 2.016 0.044 * 2617 
Grocery Store Gender -3.023 0.003 ** 2617 
Handicrafts Gender 8.425 0.000 *** 2617 
Professional Services Gender -1.214 0.225   2617 
Seamstress Services Gender 9.413 0.000 *** 2617 
Legend: † p <  0.10,  * p <  0.05, ** p <  0.01, ***p  <  0.001 
 
 
Table 2.7: T-Statistics on Industry of Entrepreneur by Family Business 
 
Industry by T-Stat Pr> |t|   Observations 
Taxi Services Family -1.348 0.178   2581 
Bar/Snack Bar Family -11.874 0.000 *** 2581 
Beauty Salon Family 3.524 0.000 *** 2581 
Confectioner Family 1.681 0.093 † 2581 
Contractor Family 5.596 0.000 *** 2581 
Domestic Services Family 7.411 0.000 *** 2581 
Education/Classes Family 1.690 0.091 † 2581 
General Retail Family -2.240 0.025 * 2581 
General Services Family 2.617 0.009 ** 2581 
Variety Store Family -2.028 0.043 * 2581 
Grocery Store Family -6.576 0.000 *** 2581 
Handicrafts Family 2.519 0.012 * 2581 
Professional Services Family 1.467 0.143   2581 
Seamstress Services Family 2.836 0.005 ** 2581 
Legend: † p <  0.10,  * p <  0.05, ** p <  0.01, ***p  <  0.001 
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Table 2.8: T-Statistics on Industry of Entrepreneur by Motivation 
 
Industry by T-Stat Pr> |t|   Observations 
Taxi Services Motivation -1.668 0.095 † 2533 
Bar/Snack Bar Motivation -1.526 0.127   2533 
Beauty Salon Motivation 1.861 0.063 † 2533 
Confectioner Motivation 0.884 0.377   2533 
Contractor Motivation 1.524 0.128   2533 
Domestic Services Motivation 4.944 0.000 *** 2533 
Education/Classes Motivation -1.790 0.074 † 2533 
General Retail Motivation -2.066 0.039 * 2533 
General Services Motivation -2.150 0.032 * 2533 
Variety Store Motivation -1.021 0.308   2533 
Grocery Store Motivation 0.653 0.514   2533 
Handicrafts Motivation -1.587 0.113   2533 
Professional Services Motivation -0.539 0.590   2533 
Seamstress Services Motivation -0.621 0.535   2533 
Legend: † p <  0.10,  * p <  0.05, ** p <  0.01, ***p  <  0.001 
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CHAPTER 3: 
Venturing Outside: Which Entrepreneurs Cross Institutional Boundaries? 
INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurship has been viewed as a promising and long-lasting solution to poverty 
(Bruton, 2010; Bruton, Ketchen, & Ireland, 2013). Entrepreneurs in impoverished settings, 
market places characterized by high institutional voids (London & Hart, 2011; Prahalad, 2005), 
largely operate outside of government oversight and regulation or in other words in the informal 
economy (Godfrey & Dyer, 2015). Entrepreneurs operating in the informal economy are limited 
in their capacity to elevate themselves out of poverty due to their inability to draw on formal 
institutions that facilitate and support the accumulation of resources and growth (McMullen, 
2011). Instead, entrepreneurs tend to rely on informal institutions and mechanisms (e.g., norms, 
values, reciprocity, social ties, etc.) to govern economic activity (Godfrey, 2011, 2015; Webb, 
Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009a). Informal institutions may provide structure and regulation to 
the informal economy but do not generally act as efficient substitutes for formal institutions (e.g., 
enforceable property rights) as the entrepreneur’s business transitions from a micro-organization 
that supports subsistence towards a business that generates surplus income and growth (Mair & 
Marti, 2009; Sutter, Webb, Kistruck, & Bailey, 2013).   
Impoverished settings represent an informal institutional environment as economic 
activity is largely governed by informal institutions in the presence of significant institutional 
voids – “situations where institutional arrangements that support markets are absent, weak, or 
fail to accomplish the role expected of them” (Mair & Marti, 2009: 419). The institutional 
boundaries between formal and informal institutional environments are often clearly 
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distinguishable. For example, in many emerging economies urban slums, an informal 
institutional environment, represent a stark contrast to more formal institutional environments 
and are scattered throughout metropolitan areas (Gras & Nason, 2015) (refer to figure 1.4). 
Unfortunately, impoverished settings are prevalent around the world and may be increasing in 
number and size. Recent estimates suggest that there are over 200,000 slums across the world 
containing over one billion people (Davis, 2006) and that number is expected to double to over 
two billion by the year 2030 (UN-HABITAT, 2003).   
Research on the informal economy has a long tradition of examining the rise of the 
informal economy and marginalized communities (Castells & Portes, 1989; Dau & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2014; De Soto, 1989, 2000; La Porta & Schleifer, 2008).  However, less research has 
examined what factors influence an entrepreneur’s transition out of such communities (Bruton et 
al., 2013). A fundamental assumption or argument in much of the extant research suggests that 
the solution to the informal economy and poverty resides in institutional reform that transforms 
or strengthens weak institutions into well-functioning and inclusive institutions.  However, 
Godfrey (2011) notes that: “the easily invoked (but fundamentally incorrect) notion of weak 
institutions provides an overly simplistic solution to a complex problem. In reality, the 
institutions supporting and sustaining the informal economy and poverty prove remarkably 
robust, strong, and able to resist change and reform” (Godfrey, 2011: 266; Mair, Marti, & 
Ventresca, 2012). Similarly, research on institutional change and entrepreneurship suggests that 
regulatory reform may lead to unsatisfactory or even unanticipated consequences because of its 
interaction with cognitive and normative institutions (informal institutions) (De Castro, Khavul, 
& Bruton, 2014; Eberhart, Eesley, & Eisenhardt, 2015; Eesley, Hsu, & Roberts, 2014; Sine & 
David, 2010). As an illustration of this point, many emerging economies have exhibited high 
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levels of entrepreneurial activity and have improved the quality of their formal institutions but 
such entrepreneurial activity and institutional reform have not lead to significant improvement in 
overall poverty levels (Bruton et al., 2013; World Resources Institute, 2007). This reality, points 
toward the need for more research that examines the interaction between formal and informal 
institutions on entrepreneurship (Eberhart, Eesley, Cheng, & Skousen, 2015; Hiatt, Sine, & 
Tolbert, 2009; Peredo & McLean, 2013) and the boundaries between the formal and informal 
economy (Webb, Ireland, & Ketchen, 2014; Webb, et al., 2009a).  
The interaction between formal and informal institutional environments leads to 
institutional pluralism, which results in competing pressures and conflicts between normative 
and regulatory expectations (Kraatz & Block, 2008, Webb, et al., 2009a). This friction in 
competing institutions influences the entrepreneur’s decision to exit the informal economy 
(Skousen & Mahoney, 2015). Yet, what remains unexamined is our understanding of the 
antecedents that influence whether or not entrepreneurs who are operating in informal 
institutional environments will venture outside their informal institutional environment by 
crossing institutional boundaries into more formal institutional environments. Crossing 
institutional boundaries influences the entrepreneur’s ability to identify, evaluate, and exploit 
entrepreneurial opportunities which has important implications for transitioning out of poverty 
(Bruton et al., 2013; Ketchen, Ireland, & Webb, 2014). However, as entrepreneurs cross 
institutional boundaries into a more formal institutional environment they encounter institutional 
pluralism or a different set of institutionalized rules, norms, and expectations about business 
practices which may lead to an entrepreneur’s reluctance to cross institutional boundaries (Kraatz 
& Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010). Furthermore, crossing institutional boundaries leads to 
greater visibility by and oversight from the government thereby increasing the pressure for the 
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entrepreneur to exit the informal economy and enter the formal economy by complying with 
government regulation (e.g., registration requirements) (De Castro et al., 2014; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Webb et al., 2009a).  Thus, the inherent paradox, crossing institutional boundaries 
offers many potential benefits to the entrepreneur yet introduces significant challenges that can 
lead to the entrepreneur’s business being delegitimized or even shut down.   
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the factors that influence whether an 
entrepreneur who operates in an informal institutional environment (represented by quadrants 1 
and 2 in figure 1.1) crosses into a formal institutional environment.  This study distinguishes 
between crossing institutional boundaries for clients and suppliers; and proposes that crossing 
institutional boundaries for suppliers relative to clients may introduce greater friction between 
competing institutions.  Specifically, this study examines how the entrepreneur’s motivation for 
starting a business and level of education can influence whether the entrepreneur crosses 
institutional boundaries for clients and suppliers. It then examines how operating as a family 
business may also be associated with crossing institutional boundaries.  
The data used in this study derive from a community survey that was administered door 
by door by a third party on behalf of the state government of Rio de Janeiro to assist in 
identifying and evaluating the entire population of entrepreneurs in the urban slum of 
Manguinhos in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Large and representative datasets are uncommon in 
informal economy research due to limitations on identifying and accessing entrepreneurs that 
operate informally and in underdeveloped institutional environments (Bruton, 2010; Bruton et 
al., 2013). Consequently, empirical findings in such settings “remain tentative because they 
derive from only a small number of surveys and relatively small samples” (Williams & Nadin, 
2010: 371). As such, this study provides a unique and rich understanding of an important and 
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understudied context and avoids potential biases in sample selection which is difficult to 
minimize in informal economy research because entrepreneurs operating informally may be 
unwilling to acknowledge that they are operating illegally (Bruton, Ireland, & Ketchen, 2012; 
Godfrey, 2011; London & Hart, 2011; McGahan, 2012).  
This study makes several contributions to the literature on the informal economy 
(Godfrey, 2015; 2011; Webb et al., 2013, Webb et al., 2009a), entrepreneurship in 
underdeveloped contexts (Bruton et al., 2013; London & Hart, 2011; Prahalad, 2005), and 
institutions and entrepreneurship (Sine & David, 2010). First, this study provides unprecedented 
insight into the mobility of entrepreneurs in informal institutional environments and to 
understanding who is more likely to interact with incongruent institutions by crossing 
institutional boundaries.  Second, it does so by theoretically differentiating between crossing 
intuitional boundaries for clients and suppliers. Although prior work has emphasized the 
interaction of institutions (e.g., Sine & David, 2010; Webb et al., 2009a), this study is one of the 
first to emphasize that the interaction of institutions may have different antecedents depending 
on whether that interaction occurs in upstream (suppliers) or down-stream (clients) economic 
activity (Skousen & Mahoney, 2015).  Third, this study builds upon on institutional theory but 
also draws on other theoretical perspectives beyond institutional theory, which has been the 
predominate perspective used to examine the informal economy (Ketchen, Ireland, & Webb, 
2014). 
 In the following sections specific hypotheses are developed on the factors that influence 
crossing institutional boundaries and then empirically examined using ordered logit and logistic 
regression analyses while controlling for a variety of variables across different levels of analysis 
and performing additional robustness checks. The study concludes with a discussion of the 
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empirical results, implications for current theory and policymakers, and potential avenues for 
future management research. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Institutional Environments 
Institutions establish “the rules of the game” and thereby define what is acceptable within 
a society (North, 1990: 3).  Institutions can be broadly classified into formal and informal 
institutions (North, 1990). Formal institutions are regulations and laws that are codified and 
enforced, often by the state, establishing the boundaries of what is legal (Suchman, Steward, & 
Westfall, 2001). More recently, formal institutions have been conceptualized broadly to include 
supporting apparatuses such as capital/labor markets, education, health care, utilities, and 
infrastructure (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Mair & Marti, 2009). In contrast, informal institutions 
are beliefs, values and norms that establish what are socially accepted and expected patterns of 
behavior (Aldrich & Baker, 2001). The combination of formal and informal institutions within a 
well-defined space (e.g., country, region, city, community, group, etc.) creates an institutional 
environment that leads to an institutional logic where there is shared meaning that provides 
coherence to social life and expectations about social behavior (Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 
2008; Scott, 2008; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). 
Institutional environments vary in their support for entrepreneurial activity and specific types of 
entrepreneurship (Terjesen, Hessels, & Li, 2013).  Formal and informal institutions may 
converge or diverge in their support (or lack of support) for entrepreneurial activity leading to 
different types of entrepreneurship (Eberhart, Eesley, Cheng, & Skousen, 2015).  One notable 
outcome of when formal and informal institutions diverge is informal business (Webb, et al., 
2009a) particularly in the context of entrepreneurship in impoverished settings (Bruton et al., 
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2013). Such cases represent situations where informal institutions are largely supportive of 
entrepreneurial activity but formal institutions either consider such activity illegal and/or do not 
provide adequate support or access to resources that facilitate growth due to weak or insecure 
institutions (low quality) or incomplete or absent institutions (institutional voids) (Godfrey, 
2011).  As a consequence, entrepreneurship in areas that are high in institutional voids often 
occurs in institutional environments that can be classified as informal institutional environments. 
Informal institutional environments are defined as institutional environments (the combination of 
formal and informal institutions within a well-defined space) where economic activity is largely 
governed by informal institutions that are supportive of the informal economy and consider 
informal economic activity as an acceptable or legitimate form of economic activity and where 
formal institutions are relatively absent (i.e., high institutional voids). On the other hand formal 
institutional environments are institutional environments where economic activity is largely 
governed by informal institutions that are not supportive of the informal economy and consider 
informal economic activity as an unacceptable or illegitimate form of economic activity and 
where formal institutions are influential and well-functioning.  
Interaction at Different Points in the Value Chain 
Entrepreneurs operating in informal institutional environments may interact with more 
formal institutional environments at any stage in the entrepreneurship process and throughout 
their value chain activities (Chen, 2007; De Castro et al., 2014). The interaction between 
institutional environments is a situation that researchers refer to as institutional pluralism 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010). Confronting and 
managing institutional pluralism may create significant challenges for entrepreneurs (Fisher, 
Kotha, & Lahiri, forthcoming), particularly for unregistered (informal) entrepreneurs operating in 
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formal institutional environments as they lack both legal and normative thresholds for 
legitimacy. However, the interaction between institutional environments may produce greater 
friction and challenges to the entrepreneur if the interaction occurs in upstream (suppliers) 
relative to downstream (clients) economic activity (Skousen & Mahoney, 2015).  As 
entrepreneurs cross institutional boundaries to sell their products to clients they increase their 
visibility to government agencies (formal institutions) that consider such activity as illegal. As a 
consequence it is difficult for unregistered entrepreneurs to openly market their products. 
Furthermore, clients may consider through normative institutions that such businesses are 
illegitimate and may refuse to purchase the entrepreneur’s goods and services. However, 
entrepreneurs that cross institutional boundaries for suppliers may be subjected to greater 
transactional hazards and weak bargaining positions relative to those associated with interacting 
with clients.  
As entrepreneurs interact with suppliers from a more formal institutional environment 
informal institutions may be less effective in correcting transactions that did not comply with ex 
ante or ex post expectations or institutional logics (Khavul, Chavez, & Bruton, 2013; Kistruck, 
Beamish, Qureshi, & Sutter, 2013). As such, suppliers in more formal institutional environments 
may be less willing to establish a deep relationship (e.g., establishing credit) with entrepreneurs 
from informal institutional environments. Consequently, entrepreneurs based in informal 
institutional environments may subject themselves to the costs associated with small numbers 
bargaining leading to strategic vulnerability as the supplier can engage in opportunistic pricing 
and other opportunistic behavior (Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, & Ireland, 2011). Furthermore, Chen 
(2007) notes that transactions that occur outside of government oversight tend to be governed by 
the firm with a stronger bargaining position, which tends to be the more formal firm. This 
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phenomenon places entrepreneurs from informal institutional environments in a weaker 
bargaining position and subject to substantial transaction cost hazards, which may take the form 
of enforcement, monitoring, negotiation and searching costs to manage and/or correct 
transactions with suppliers (Kistruck, et al., 2013).  
Taken together these findings illustrate the importance of distinguishing between crossing 
institutional boundaries for clients vs. suppliers as the mechanisms that lead to friction between 
competing institutions may be different for clients and suppliers and be associated with different 
factors.  The remainder of this chapter examines the antecedents or factors that influence whether 
or not entrepreneurs who are operating in informal institutional environments will cross 
institutional boundaries into more formal institutional environments. 
Factors that Influence Crossing Institutional Boundaries 
Start-up Motivation 
To understand entrepreneurial behavior and outcomes it is critical to understand the 
entrepreneur’s motivation underpinning entrepreneurial action.  In informal institutional 
environments research suggests or largely assumes that entrepreneurs start their business out of 
economic necessity to sustain life (Holmén, Min, & Saarelainen, 2011; London & Hart, 2011). 
While, the majority of entrepreneurs are motivated out of necessity, as outlined in chapter 2, 
surprisingly entrepreneurial motivations for starting a business in informal institutional 
environments are quite heterogeneous in nature and can lead to different entrepreneurial 
outcomes. Entrepreneurship research on motivation has shown that the reason for starting a 
business highly influences entrepreneurial action (Hessels, van Gelderen, & Thurik, 2008; 
Shane, Locke, & Collins, 2003; Stephan, Hart, & Drews, 2015; Stoner & Fry, 1982). Consistent 
with prior research on entrepreneurial motivation, motivations for starting a business can be 
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distinguished between opportunity and necessity motivations, also referred to as push and pull 
factors (Kirkwood, 2009; Schjoedt & Shaver, 2007). Push factors refer to the conflict between 
one’s current and one’s desired occupational status that may push an individual into starting a 
business (necessity-based entrepreneurship) when other alternatives to achieve an individual’s 
desired outcomes are unavailable.  Common examples of push factors include unemployment 
and dissatisfaction with current employment. Pull factors refer to the entrepreneur’s expectation 
of potential awards and being better off by starting a business (opportunity-based 
entrepreneurship). Examples of pull factors include autonomy, independence, need for control, 
and social status (Amit & Muller, 1995; Bhola, Verheul, Thurik, & Grilo, 2006; Uhlaner & 
Thurik, 2007).  
Research on push and pull factors indicate entrepreneurs motivated by pull factors are 
associated with higher growth ambitions, risk tolerance, confidence to overcome obstacles, and a 
lower fear of failure compared to entrepreneurs driven by push factors (Bhola et al., 2006; 
Morris, Miyasaki, Watters, & Coombes. 2006).  Consequently, entrepreneurs motivated by pull 
factors tend to be financially more successful than entrepreneurs motivated by push factors 
(Amit & Muller, 1995). However, recent research suggests that some opportunity-motivated 
entrepreneurs may share some similar motivations as necessity-driven entrepreneurs such as a 
desire to maintain and even to increase income (Hessels et al., 2008). Thus, recent studies have 
begun to distinguish a subset of opportunity-motivated entrepreneurs into improvement-driven 
entrepreneurs who seek to increase their independence and autonomy, or their personal income 
(yet are not motivated by a high degree of wealth/money) but are not pushed into 
entrepreneurship or considered to be necessity-based entrepreneurs (Bosma, Wennekers, & 
Amoros, 2011; Stephan et al., 2015). 
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Taken together, research on entrepreneurial motivation suggests that opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurs, including improvement-driven entrepreneurs, may be more likely to cross from 
informal institutional environments into more formal institutional environments as they are more 
confident in overcoming obstacles, more likely to seek productivity and efficiency gains, and 
have higher growth ambitions compared to necessity based entrepreneurs. As more formal 
institutional environments provide entrepreneurs with better access to benefits from formal 
institutions and broader market opportunities, entrepreneurs driven by pull factors are expected 
to be more likely to cross institutional boundaries.   
Hypothesis 1a: Opportunity-driven entrepreneurs are positively associated with crossing 
institutional boundaries for clients. 
Hypothesis 1b: Opportunity-driven entrepreneurs are positively associated with crossing 
institutional boundaries for suppliers. 
Hypothesis 2a: Improvement-driven entrepreneurs are positively associated with crossing 
institutional boundaries for clients. 
Hypothesis 2b: Improvement driven entrepreneurs are positively associated with crossing 
institutional boundaries for suppliers. 
 
Human Capital  
As entrepreneurs in informal institutional environments cross into more formal 
institutional environments they encounter institutional pluralism and competing pressures 
between formal and informal institutions (De Castro et al., 2014; Friedland & Alford, 1991; 
Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010). Institutional pluralism creates significant 
challenges for the entrepreneur as institutional logics represent distinct social worlds that may 
not be compatible (Fisher et al., Forthcoming) and as the effectiveness of informal institutions as 
substitutes for formal institutions in informal institutional environments may be less effective in 
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more formal environments or even at odds with expectations (Godfrey, 2015). Furthermore, 
crossing institutional boundaries may lead to greater levels of institutional ambiguity between 
legal rules and enforcement capabilities by government agencies as government agencies do not 
always consistently or fairly apply or enforce the law (Godfrey, 2011; Skousen & Mahoney, 
2015).     
An entrepreneur’s willingness to engage with competing institutions and ability to 
understand and adapt to competing pressures influences the entrepreneur’s capacity to grow their 
business and transition out of the informal economy and also poverty. In impoverished settings, 
human capital has been shown to be a salient predictor of an entrepreneur’s willingness to 
engage with surroundings, to search for new products or vendors, and transact with unfamiliar 
exchange partners (Kintgen, Kroll, & Rose, 1988; London, Esper, Grogan-Kaylor, & Kistruck, 
2014; Rosa & Viswanathan, 2007).  These findings suggest that entrepreneurs with higher levels 
of human capital in informal institutional environments will not only have greater capacity to 
understand competing institutional pressures but also greater willingness to engage with them via 
crossing institutional boundaries.  
Human capital refers to “the skills and knowledge that individuals acquire through 
investment in schooling, on-the-job training, and other types of experience” (Unger, Rauch, 
Frese, & Rosenbusch, 2011: 343). Human capital theory (e.g., Becker, 1962, 1964; Schultz, 
1961) suggests that entrepreneurs who have a greater stock of knowledge will have greater 
cognitive ability which will lead to more productive and efficient activity (Block & Sandner, 
2009). As such, individuals with higher levels of human capital are generally associated with 
higher levels of legitimacy and respect. While the concept of human capital is multi-dimensional 
in nature, this study focuses on the entrepreneur’s education level as a key measure of human 
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capital, which has been shown to be positively related to entrepreneurial performance (Murphy, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1991) and sense making of the institutional environment (De Castro et al., 
2014). Hence, it is expected that entrepreneurs with higher levels of education will be more 
likely to cross institutional boundaries as they should have greater capacity to understand 
incongruent institutions and the ability to confront and manage the challenges associated with 
institutional pluralism. 
Hypothesis 3a: As the entrepreneur’s level of education increases, the entrepreneur is more 
likely to cross institutional boundaries for clients. 
Hypothesis 3b: As the entrepreneur’s level of education increases, the entrepreneur is more 
likely to cross institutional boundaries for suppliers. 
Family Business  
Family business is a common form of ownership in informal institutional environments 
(Gras, & Nason, 2015) where entrepreneurs have to mitigate high levels of institutional voids 
(Anderson, Markides & Kupp, 2010; Mair & Marti, 2009). Families provide a unique source of 
resources, including both human and financial capital, which may increase the family business’ 
ability to survive and compete in institutional environments that lack well-functioning formal 
institutions (Dyer & Mortenson, 2005; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Family relationships represent a 
collective identity of an institutionalized group which in turn can influence and shape behavior to 
be consistent with family expectations and logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) and create higher 
levels of trust (Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 2004).  Frequent association and emotional closeness 
among family members creates shared values and a sense of responsibility to the group (Miller, 
Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001).   
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These attributes of family businesses lead to less reliance on formal institutions for 
resources (Khavul, Bruton, & Wood, 2009) and as a control mechanism (Schulze, et al., 2001). 
Rather, family businesses tend to rely more heavily on their social ties within their immediate 
and extended families and within their local communities (Khavul et al., 2009).  Family 
businesses have the advantage of implicit contracting that can be enforced through informal 
control mechanisms such as creating a culture of compliance or clan like behavior to reduce 
agency and monitoring costs (Daily & Dollinger, 1991; Kotey, 2005; Schulze, et al., 2001). 
These advantages may be even more pronounced in informal institutional environments where 
informal institutions govern economic activity and the boundaries between firm and family are 
often more inextricably linked (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; Gras, & Nason, 2015).  
Taken together, these attributes of family businesses suggest that family businesses are 
less likely to cross institutional boundaries as family businesses are more strongly embedded in 
their social ties and societal logics within their local communities (Thornton, 2004). Furthermore 
family businesses tend to rely less on formal institutions as a control mechanism and have 
greater access to alternative resources in informal institutional environments.  
Hypothesis 4a: Family businesses are negatively associated with crossing institutional 
boundaries for clients. 
Hypothesis 4b: Family businesses are negatively associated with crossing institutional 
boundaries for suppliers. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
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The data used in this study derive from a community survey of entrepreneurs in the urban 
slum of Manguinhos in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Ordered logit and logistic regression analyses 
were used to examine the entrepreneur’s behavior of crossing institutional boundaries. The 
survey data provide an appropriate setting to empirically evaluate the hypotheses developed in 
this study as the data provide the location of the entrepreneur’s clients and suppliers. The survey 
was performed by a third party administrator on behalf of the state government of Rio de Janeiro 
to assist in identifying and evaluating the entire population of entrepreneurs in the community. 
The survey was administered door by door by trained employees during the period July 2008 to 
April 2009. A total of 2,833 entrepreneurs were identified.  Of this total, 57 refused to participate 
in the survey and 61 were unable to be contacted. For those entrepreneurs that were unable to be 
contacted, survey administrators made an attempt to visit them on three different occasions on 
different days and times in an effort to have them participate in the survey.  The total number of 
entrepreneurs that completed the survey was 2,715 representing 95.8% of the total population of 
entrepreneurs identified. The responses were analyzed and subsequently verified in the field on 
approximately 20% of the respondents to ensure validity. For purposes of this study, businesses 
that were associated with the government or operated as a not-for-profit (a total of 98 businesses) 
were excluded from this study resulting in an available sample size of 2,617. After removing 
missing responses for the variables of interest, the total sample size was 2,009 businesses.  
 
Variables 
Dependent Variable. The dependent variables in this study are ordinal measures for 
crossing institutional boundaries and are based on whether the entrepreneur crossed institutional 
boundaries to exchange goods and services with clients and suppliers. The location of clients and 
suppliers was set to “1” if they were located within Manguinhos, in adjacent neighborhoods 
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outside of Manguinhos to “2,” and in the city outside of adjacent neighborhoods or outside of the 
city limits of Rio de Janeiro to “3”. The use of an ordinal measure of crossing institutional 
boundaries is conceptually accurate. Manguinhos is surrounded by adjacent neighborhoods (e.g., 
Benfica, Bonsucesso, Higienopolis, Jacarezinho) that are less developed compared to other more 
affluent neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro (e.g., Zona Sul, City Center, etc.), which justifies the 
use of a continuous measure of crossing institutional boundaries. 
Explanatory Variables.  Motivation was measured based on the entrepreneur’s response 
to the question, “why did you start the business?” Consistent with prior literature on 
entrepreneurial motivation, this study distinguishes between opportunity-driven, improvement-
driven, and necessity-based entrepreneurship. Dummy variables were created for each group. 
Opportunity-driven entrepreneurs were set to “1” if the motivation for starting the business was 
because the opportunity emerged. Improvement-driven entrepreneurs were set to “1” if the 
entrepreneur started the business to achieve greater independence/autonomy or to increase 
income but not out of necessity. Necessity-based entrepreneurs serve as the reference group and 
were coded as “1” if the entrepreneur started the business because they were unemployed or 
other necessity-based reason listed by the entrepreneur. Education was measured as a continuous 
variable based on the level of formal education obtained, ranging from “1” (no formal schooling) 
to “8” (attended university). Family business was measured based on the entrepreneur’s response 
to the question, “is your business considered a family business, non-family, or mixed?” 
Businesses that operated as a family business were coded as “1” and set to “0” if otherwise.   
Control Variables. A number of control variables spanning different levels of analysis 
were included in the regression analyses that could potentially influence whether the 
entrepreneur crosses institutional boundaries. At the individual-level, this study controls for the 
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entrepreneur’s gender and age.  Gender differences are examined by creating a binary variable 
set to “1” for male and “0” for female. The entrepreneur’s age was coded as a continuous 
variable in number of years. Firm- and community-level control variables were included to proxy 
for the visibility of the firm by law enforcement/government agencies and the size of the firm.  
The first measure, area, identifies the location of the business within Manguinhos and was coded 
based on the four geographic areas within Manguinhos that the government uses to manage 
government programs. Each area within Manguinhos varies based on its level of economic 
development and accessibility. The area that was identified as having the greatest number of 
entrepreneurs was coded as “1” and the other areas were set to “0”.   The second measure of 
visibility, formal, was measured based on whether or not the entrepreneur’s business was 
registered with the government and was measured based on the entrepreneur’s response to the 
question, “is your business formal or informal?” The third measure, oversight, was measured 
based on the entrepreneur’s response to the question, “what is the level of difficulty you have 
with government regulation and oversight?” Responses ranged on a scale from “High” to “Not 
Applicable.” Responses were coded on a 4-point scale where High = “3”, Medium = “2”, Low = 
“1” and Not Applicable = “0”. Responses for those entrepreneurs that responded “Did Not 
Know” were coded as “0”.  Fourth, firms operating in a storefront property, storefront, were 
coded as “1” if the entrepreneur operated in either an owned or rented storefront property and set 
to “0” if otherwise (e.g., street cart, in the home, door to door sales, etc.). To a certain degree, 
this measure also controls for the firm’s size as entrepreneurs that have garnered enough 
resources to operate in a storefront property tend to be bigger and more financially successful. To 
further control for firm size a control variable was created for firms that had employees. Firms 
with employees were set to “1” and “0” if otherwise.    
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Several measures of institutional voids were created that measure the degree of difficulty 
that entrepreneurs encounter as a consequence of institutional voids. Such voids may influence 
whether an entrepreneur crosses institutional boundaries. Each measure of institutional voids is 
based on the entrepreneur’s response to the question of what is the level of difficulty the 
entrepreneur has with a specific institutional void. Responses ranged on a scale from “High” to 
“Not Applicable”. Responses were coded on a 4-point scale where High = “3,” Medium = “2,” 
Low = “1” and Not Applicable = “0”. Responses for those entrepreneurs that responded “Did 
Not Know” were coded as “0”.  
Finance voids represent the absence or lack of quality financial markets.  This study 
focuses on the ability of the entrepreneur to access credit. This measure is captured by the 
entrepreneur’s response to the question, “what is the level of difficulty to access credit?” 
Infrastructure voids represent the absence or lack of quality public infrastructure. The 
entrepreneur was asked a separate question for the level of difficulty with each of the following 
types of infrastructure: electricity, water and telecommunication. An aggregate score was created 
by combing each response to measure the overall difficulty with infrastructure voids. Labor 
voids represent the absence of skilled labor in the community. This measure is captured by the 
entrepreneur’s response to the question, “what is the level of difficulty to find skilled/qualified 
labor in the community?” Market voids represent the absence of well-functioning exchange 
markets. This study focuses on the general market conditions of the entrepreneur’s customers. 
This measure is captured by the entrepreneur’s response to the questions, “what is the level of 
difficulty with the economic conditions of clients?” and “what is the level of difficulty of having 
few customers?” An aggregate score was created combing each response to measure the overall 
difficulty with market voids.  These measures for institutional voids represent indicators of 
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community-specific institutional conditions. They are measured at the firm-level yet represent 
the firm’s perceptions of the institutional environment of the community in which they operate.  
Finally, this study controls for the firm’s industry which was categorized into 11 different 
industries based on the products or services sold by the firm. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 3.1 displays descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the variables. Due to 
high levels of multicollinerity between measures for institutional voids, empirical estimations 
were run independently using each measure. Only finance voids were statistically significant and 
used in subsequent models. The ordered logit and logistic regression results are summarized in 
Table 3.2.  Model 1 (2) empirically examines crossing institutional boundaries for clients 
(suppliers) using ordered logit. The two models each had a total sample size of 2009 
entrepreneurs with Pseudo R2 of 0.21 and 0.10, respectively. Overall, the results suggest that the 
proposed relationships in this study are highly influenced by whether the entrepreneur crossed 
institutional boundaries for clients compared to suppliers.  
Hypotheses 1a,1b and 2a, 2b predicted that opportunity and improvement-driven 
motivation were positively associated with crossing institutional boundaries for clients and 
suppliers. As shown in model 1, the coefficients for opportunity and improvement-driven 
motivation were not significant whereas improvement-driven motivation was both positive and 
significant (p <.05) in model 2. Thus hypothesis 2b was supported while hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 
2a were not supported. Hypotheses 3a and 3b suggested that education would be positively 
associated with crossing institutional boundaries for clients and suppliers. In model 1 the 
coefficient for education was not significant whereas in model 2 the coefficient for education is 
both positive and significant (p<.10). These results provide support for hypothesis 3b but do not 
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support hypothesis 3a. Lastly, Hypotheses 4a and 4b suggested that family businesses would be 
negatively associated with crossing institutional boundaries for clients and suppliers. Contrary to 
expected, model 1 and model 2 found significant results but opposite in sign. The coefficient in 
model 1 for family is negative and significant (p<.001), providing support for hypothesis 4a. In 
model 2 the coefficient is positive and significant (p<.001) which does not support hypothesis 
4b.  
To test the robustness of the results alternative coding was performed for crossing 
institutional boundaries for client and suppliers in an effort to verify whether the results are 
sensitive to how institutional boundaries are coded. Rather than code crossing institutional 
boundaries as an ordinal measure, the variable was recoded as a dichotomous measure and new 
model estimations were performed using logistic regression and results are provided in models 3 
and 4 of Table 3.2. Manguinhos is surrounded by adjacent neighborhoods (e.g., Benfica, 
Bonsucesso, Higienopolis, Jacarezinho) that are less developed compared to other more affluent 
neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro (e.g., Zona Sul, City Center, etc.). As such, the institutional 
boundaries between adjacent neighborhoods and Manguinhos may be weak or insignificant 
which justifies the use of a dichotomous measure of crossing institutional boundaries. 
In models 3 and 4 of Table 3.2 entrepreneurs who had clients or suppliers outside of 
Manguinhos and adjacent neighborhoods were set to “1” and those cases where the entrepreneur 
had clients or suppliers inside of Manguinhos and adjacent neighborhoods were coded as “0”. 
Similar to the ordered logit results for hypotheses 1a, 1b and 2a, 2b only the coefficient for 
improvement-driven entrepreneurship for suppliers was found to be significant in model 4 (p < 
.001), which suggests that entrepreneurs who are improvement-driven are more likely to cross 
institutional boundaries for suppliers.  Hypothesis 3a and 3b suggested that crossing institutional 
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boundaries would be positively associated with education. As shown in models 3 and 4, the 
coefficients were both positive and statistically significant at p<.10. These findings suggest that 
crossing institutional boundaries beyond adjacent neighborhoods for either clients or suppliers is 
associated with the entrepreneur’s level of education. Hypothesis 4a and 4b suggested that family 
businesses would be negatively associated with crossing institutional boundaries. The coefficient 
for family in models 3 and 4 found no relationship. Considering these findings in relation to 
models 1 and 2 suggest that family businesses are more likely to cross institutional boundaries 
for suppliers in adjacent neighborhoods surrounding Manguinhos, which are more similar to 
their institutional environment, but are not more likely to go beyond.  
As a further robustness check the models were estimated on a second urban slum called 
Rocinha. Rocinha is located in a different region of Rio de Janeiro. Geographically, Rocinha is 
isolated from the rest of the city and is only accessible through the highly affluent neighborhoods 
of Sao Conrado and Gavea.  As such, an ordinal measure of crossing institutional boundaries is 
conceptually inaccurate as crossing into adjacent neighborhoods represents a stark contrast in 
institutional environments. Therefore clients and suppliers were set to “1” if the entrepreneur’s 
clients or suppliers were outside of Rocinha and set to “0” if they were located in Rocinha. 
Logistic regression results (Clients: N=1925, Pseudo R2= 0.28; Suppliers: N=1925, Pseudo R2= 
0.20) were generally consistent with the logistic regression results for Manguinhos (Models 3 
and 4). Crossing institutional boundaries for clients had no statistically significant relationship 
with the independent variables except for opportunity-driven, which was marginally significant 
(p<.10) and negative. Whereas crossing institutional boundaries for suppliers was statistically 
associated with all the independent variables in the hypothesized directions. The coefficients for 
opportunity-driven and improvement-driven motivations were both positive and statistically 
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significant (p<.001). The coefficient for education was positive and statistically significant at 
p<.05.  The coefficient for family was negative and statistically significant at p<.001, suggesting 
that family businesses are less likely to cross institutional boundaries for suppliers.  Overall, the 
additional analyses provide further support for the relationships identified in this study. A 
summary of the results are provided in Table 5.2. 
As final robustness check entrepreneurs that were legally registered were removed from 
the sample and both the ordered logit and logistic regression models were re-estimated. 
Entrepreneur’s that are registered with the government should not encounter the same normative 
friction in crossing institutional boundaries compared to unregistered entrepreneurs. Results from 
the new estimations were consistent with previous models providing further support for the 
relationships identified in this study. 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The purpose of this study was to examine whether entrepreneurs in informal institutional 
environments cross into formal institutional boundaries. The findings provide unique insight into 
the mobility of entrepreneurs in impoverished settings and have important implications for 
scholars and policymakers interested in institutions, poverty and informal economy research 
(Bruton, et al., 2013). This study makes a contribution to the informal economy (Godfrey, 2011, 
2015; Webb et al., 2009a) and institutions and entrepreneurship literature (Sine & David, 2010) 
by developing theory to better explain and predict who may interact with competing institutions 
and for what reason (clients vs. suppliers). Although prior work has emphasized the interaction 
of institutions, this study extends prior research by examining antecedents that may influence an 
entrepreneur’s decision to interact with competing institutions across different points in the value 
chain.  Empirical findings indicate that explanatory variables that predict whether entrepreneurs 
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cross institutional boundaries have quite different and in some cases opposite effects based on 
whether crossing institutional boundaries was to interact with clients versus suppliers. These 
findings point to the increased need for understanding the interaction of institutions at different 
points in the value chain as they may have different effects on the entrepreneur’s willingness and 
ability to interact with other institutional environments.  
The empirical findings for motivation indicate that the motivation for starting a business 
is strongly associated with crossing institutional boundaries for suppliers but not for clients. As 
hypothesized a positive and significant affect is found for improvement-driven entrepreneurs 
across all models. Yet, opportunity-based entrepreneurs was only found to be positive and 
significant for suppliers in Rocinha, offering partial support for opportunity-based entrepreneurs 
being more likely to cross institutional boundaries for suppliers.  Interestingly results indicate 
that opportunity-driven entrepreneurship tends to be negatively associated with crossing 
institutional boundaries for clients. However, it is only statistically significant for Rocinha at 
p<.10. This finding suggests that opportunity-driven entrepreneurs may have a tendency to 
identify and exploit opportunities that are centric to customers embedded in their communities. 
Future research would benefit from examining the relationship between motivation and 
opportunity identification in the context of informal institutional environments.  
Turning to the results for education, results for all models associated with suppliers find a 
statistically significant and positive result whereas only model 3 for clients is positive and 
statistically significant. Overall, these findings further corroborate this study’s argument that 
interacting with suppliers relative to with clients from more formal institutional environments 
introduces increased challenges as more educated entrepreneurs are more likely to cross 
institutional boundaries for suppliers.    
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Lastly, results on family business, results in models 1 and 2 (ordered logit) appear to be 
driven by crossing institutional boundaries into adjacent neighborhoods. Recall that in the case of 
Manguinhos, adjacent neighborhoods are still considered lower developed neighborhoods within 
Rio de Janeiro. To account for this reality, models 3 and 4 combined adjacent neighborhoods 
with Manguinhos. As shown in models 3 and 4 the coefficients for clients and suppliers were not 
statistically significant.  These findings suggest that family businesses in Manguinhos are quite 
mobile within adjacent neighborhoods in their dealings with suppliers but tend to remain within 
their community to sell their goods and services. On the other hand in Rocinha results indicate 
that family businesses are less likely to cross institutional boundaries for suppliers. Taken 
together these findings suggest that family businesses are highly mobile within congruent 
institutional environments for suppliers but are less likely to go beyond as institutional 
boundaries become more incongruent.     
From a policy perspective, several of the research findings are of relevance to 
policymakers, private agencies, and not-for-profits interested in the informal economy and 
poverty. Research on the informal economy suggests that crossing into more formal institutional 
environments is an important antecedent to transitioning out of the informal economy (Skousen 
& Mahoney, 2015). The overarching finding of this study suggests that entrepreneurs encounter 
significant challenges when interacting with suppliers, as entrepreneurs with higher level of 
education and other attributes associated with productive behavior are more likely to cross 
institutional boundaries. Increased interaction with suppliers from more formal institutional 
environments allows entrepreneurs to introduce a variety of products and services with 
potentially greater value to customers into impoverished settings where entrepreneurs largely 
employ bricolage techniques to recombine low value assets into something of value (Baker & 
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Nelson, 2005; Fisher, 2012). In many cases not-for-profit organizations and social entrepreneurs 
have made concerted efforts to provide entrepreneurship education, training services, and other 
resources to underserved populations. This phenomenon is gaining importance in management 
research and to policymakers yet much research remains to be done in order to understand the 
effectiveness of such organizations. Future research would benefit from examining how such 
organizations teach entrepreneurs to interact with incongruent institutions. As Godfrey (2011) 
notes institutions that support poverty are remarkably robust, and are not easily changed. Thus, 
providing entrepreneurs better access to formal institutions is important but not sufficient in 
helping entrepreneurs transition out of poverty. Future research should also consider whether 
certain efforts to change normative beliefs and values about entrepreneurial behavior is effective 
and in some cases even ethical depending on the nature of the normative belief (Godfrey, 2011). 
These are important questions that remain unresolved in the literature yet have important 
implications to reducing poverty and understanding entrepreneurship in impoverished settings.   
Lastly, while the empirical results provide support for many of the hypotheses developed 
in this study, this research is not without limitations. While it is reasonable to assume that 
entrepreneurs that cross institutional boundaries will encounter different norms, values, and 
expectations about business practices and legal registration such differences are not explicitly 
measured in this study therefore limiting the ability to identify the precise mechanisms related to 
the explanatory variables that lead to a higher or lower likelihood of crossing institutional 
boundaries.  
Conclusion  
The informal economy remains understudied and misunderstood phenomenon, yet 
management scholars are well positioned to add value to this relatively new stream of research and 
help improve the standard of living of the billions of people who live in under-served conditions 
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throughout the world. This study provided unique insight into the mobility of entrepreneurs in 
informal institutional environments by examining the likelihood that they would cross institutional 
boundaries into more formal institutional environments. This study maintains that management 
research would benefit from focusing on the strategic behavior of entrepreneurs in impoverished 
settings and in particular their interaction with formal and informal institutions outside of their 
communities. To guide future research, important research areas were also outlined that need 
further development to better understand how entrepreneurs navigate the entrepreneurship process 
in informal institutional environments and ultimately transition out of poverty.  
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TABLE 3.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations* 
 
 
 
      Variables Mean S.D.       1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9     10     11     12     13     14 
1. Clients 1.36 0.58 1.00              
2. Suppliers 2.01 0.68 0.21 1.00             
3. Gender 0.43 0.50 0.04 0.10 1.00            
4. Opportunity Driven 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.06 0.09 1.00           
5. Improvement Driven 0.31 0.46 -0.00 0.08 0.02 -0.16 1.00          
6. Education 2.78 1.37 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.09 1.00         
7. Family Bus. 0.39 0.49 -0.20 0.12 0.10 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 1.00        
8. Age 41.82 13.08 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.09 -0.22 0.04 1.00       
9. Formal 0.04 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.21 0.04 0.18 0.06 0.04 1.00      
10. Area 0.55 0.50 0.12 -0.07 -0.16 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.42 0.03 -0.01 1.00     
11. Storefront 0.37 0.48 -0.16 0.18 0.27 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.28 0.06 0.15 -0.22 1.00    
12. Employees 0.28 0.45 -0.07 0.14 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.32 0.06 0.17 -0.04 0.34 1.00   
13. Oversight 1.35 1.15 -0.10 -0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.13 0.02 0.23 -0.01 0.02 -0.13 0.10 -0.02 1.00  
14. Finance 1.54 1.09 -0.11 0.06 0.01 -0.06 -0.14 0.03 0.30 -0.02 -0.01 -0.20 0.15 0.01 0.69 1.00 
                  
 
* Industry dummies included in analysis but not presented
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TABLE 3.2: Ordered Logit and Logistic Regression Results  
   Legend: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, # not included 
           Model 1          Model 2      Model 3    Model 4  
     Ordered Logit    Ordered Logit        Logit      Logit  
      B (S.E.)      B (S.E.)      B  (S.E.)       B (S.E.)   Corresponding 
    Hypotheses Dependent Variable:           Clients          Suppliers            Clients         Suppliers 
Independent Variables:                  
  Opportunity Driven  -0.12 (0.25)  0.23 (0.11)  -0.41 (0.61)  0.28 (0.27)   H1a, H1b  
  Improvement Driven  -0.19 (0.13)  0.25* (0.11)  0.11 (0.33)  0.49*** (0.15)   H2a, H2b  
  Education  0.04 (0.04)  0.06† (0.04)  0.18† (0.10)  0.09† (0.05)   H3a, H3b  
  Family Business  -0.57*** (0.15)  0.44*** (0.13)  0.14 (0.35)  -0.14 (0.16)   H4a, H4b  
Control Variables:                      
  Gender  0.32* (0.14)  0.17 (0.12)  0.23 (0.40)  0.35* (0.16)     
  Age  0.01* (0.00)  -0.00 (0.00)  0.02† (0.01)  -0.00 (0.01)     
  Formal  1.72*** (0.29)  0.39 (0.29)  2.45*** (0.47)  0.50 (0.34)      
  Clients       #     #    1.12*** (0.10)       #     #  2.35*** (0.34)     
  Suppliers  1.06*** (0.11)      #     #  2.45*** (0.34)       #  #     
  Area  0.12 (0.13)  -0.12 (0.11)  0.38 (0.33)  -0.05 (0.15)     
  Storefront  -0.54*** (0.15)  0.73*** (0.12)  -0.17 (0.38)  0.62*** (0.16)     
  Employees  -0.11 (0.15)  0.26* (0.13)  0.17 (0.37)  0.79*** (0.16)     
  Oversight  -0.12† (0.07)  -0.22*** (0.06)  -0.22 (0.18)  -0.38*** (0.08)     
  Finance  -0.16* (0.07)  0.26*** (0.06)  -0.08 (0.19)  0.34*** (0.08)     
  Industry:                       
     Taxi & Delivery  1.92*** (0.43)  -0.72† (0.44)  1.83* (0.88)  -0.39 (0.54)     
     Bar / Restaurant  -1.47*** (0.27)  -1.18*** (0.22)  -1.34† (0.81)  -1.18*** (0.27)     
     Confectioner  -0.49† (0.25)  -1.07*** (0.23)  -0.38 (0.89)  -1.82*** (0.37)     
     Contractor  1.36*** (0.28)  -1.21*** (0.27)  1.65* (0.69)  -1.31*** (0.38)     
     Domestic Services  1.39*** (0.24)  -1.42*** (0.24)  0.81 (0.77)  -1.91*** (0.51)     
     General Retail  0.42 (0.33)  -0.10 (0.33)  -0.44 (0.79)  0.16 (0.36)     
     General Services  0.04 (0.22)  -0.89*** (0.21)  0.12 (0.62)  -0.89*** (0.26)     
     Variety Store  -0.84* (0.35)  -0.39 (0.29)  -0.23 (0.90)  -0.74* (0.36)     
     Groceries / Food  -0.90*** (0.28)  -0.75** (0.24)  -2.41* (1.22)  -1.07*** (0.31)     
     Handicrafts  0.48† (0.27)  0.18 (0.28)  0.63 (0.69)  0.18 (0.33)     
_cut 1  1.71 (0.33)  -1.32 (0.29)           
_cut 2    4.94 (0.36)  2.38 (0.30)           
_cons        -6.32*** (0.98)  -1.98*** (0.39)     
Model Significance                 
  McFadden’s R2  0.21   0.10   0.35   0.19      
  N=    2009     2009     2009     2009      
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CHAPTER 4: 
Formality in Informality: Participating in the Formal Economy in Informal Institutional 
Environments  
INTRODUCTION 
Research in entrepreneurship in informal institutional environments characterized by high 
institutional voids and poverty is gaining importance in the management literature (Bruton, 2010; 
Khanna & Palepu, 1997; London & Hart, 2011; Prahalad, 2005). Current estimates suggest that 
nearly 2.5 billion people live in extreme poverty, based on an income of $2 or less a day (Bruton, 
Ketchen, & Ireland, 2013).  Entrepreneurs in informal institutional environments largely operate 
outside of government oversight and regulation. In fact, much of the world economy operates 
outside of the purview of government influence. Research on the size of the informal economy 
suggests that the informal economy produces as high as 40 to 60% of gross domestic product in 
many emerging economies and as high as 10 to 20% in more developed economies (Schneider 
2002, 2005; Webb, Bruton, Tihanyi, & Ireland, 2013). Management scholars have only recently 
turned their attention towards the study of the informal economy and recognized it as an 
important understudied phenomenon to which management scholars may contribute (Godfrey, 
2015, 2011; McGahan, 2012). 
  The informal economy is defined as economic activity that takes place outside of 
government regulation and oversight and is best conceptualized as a continuum of the 
entrepreneur’s level of compliance with the government as entrepreneurs may choose to comply 
with some forms of regulation (e.g., payment of taxes) and disregard others (e.g., the use of 
undocumented workers) (Godfrey, 2015; 2011). A common form of illegal activity, and the 
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focus of this dissertation chapter, is the failure of entrepreneurs to register their business with the 
government which enables the government to track and oversee economic activity (De Castro, 
Khavul, & Bruton, 2014; Nichter & Goldmark, 2009).  
Research on the informal economy has long explored the question of what prompts 
entrepreneurs and firms to register, and has been largely examined from an institutional or 
legalistic perspective (see review by Godfrey, 2011). The institutional perspective underscores 
that entrepreneurship is a socially constructed behavior conditioned by its social environment 
(Sine & David, 2010). This perspective posits that entrepreneurs are more likely to register when 
formal institutions facilitate registration through lower registration fees and less legal 
bureaucratic impediments, and offer higher levels of property rights protection and quality of 
services that benefit the entrepreneur (Dau & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; De Soto, 1989, 2000; La 
Porta & Schleifer, 2008; Marcouiller & Young, 1995; Nwabuzor, 2005; Webb et al., 2013; 
Zinnes, 2009). However, Godfrey (2011) notes that the institutional perspective tends to over-
emphasize the role and quality of regulatory institutional frameworks and neglects cognitive and 
normative institutions (Scott, 2008), which include the beliefs, values, norms, and customs that 
impact the likelihood of registration. Recent qualitative studies support this view and illustrate 
that the principal barriers to registration may not be the direct financial costs or information 
search costs associated with registration (De Castro, et al., 2014; De Mel, McKenzie, & 
Woodruff, 2013). 
Recent research in the extant management literature on the informal economy has begun 
to incorporate cognitive and normative institutions, which can be joined within the broad 
category of informal institutions (North, 1990). Within this perspective, the informal economy is 
defined as those “economic activities that are outside of formal institutional boundaries (i.e., 
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illegal) yet fall within informal institutional boundaries (i.e., legitimate)” (Webb et al., 2013: 3; 
Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009a). This definition adds clarity to the context of the 
informal economy, which is often referred to as an unregulated market even though the informal 
economy may be highly regulated by informal institutions that confer legitimacy to unregistered 
entrepreneurs. Research within this perspective has largely been theoretical and focuses on the 
potential interaction between formal and informal institutions, and emphasizes that the decision 
to register is strategic in nature as rational decision makers weigh the costs and benefits of 
registration (De Castro, et al., 2014, Siqueira, Webb, & Bruton, forthcoming, Uzo & Mair, 
2014). However, this research gives little attention to the entrepreneurs’ individual attributes and 
the firm’s strategic actions and organizational processes within the informal economy that may 
influence the entrepreneur’s likelihood of registering. 
Drawing upon a variety of theories in management research this study moves beyond 
traditional macro-level explanations of the informal economy (Dau & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; 
Thai & Turkina, 2014) and argues that examining micro- and firm-level differences between 
registered and unregistered entrepreneurs may inform current theorizing on the informal 
economy (Barney & Felin, 2013, Webb & Ireland, 2015). Traditional macro-level theories of the 
informal economy provide adequate explanations for why entrepreneurship in informal 
institutional environments exists (quadrant 1 of figure 1.1); however, it does little to explain why 
entrepreneurs operating in informal institutional environments may participate in the formal 
economy (quadrant 2 of figure 1.1).  While entrepreneurs in informal institutional environments 
are generally participating in the informal economy they may participate in either the formal or 
informal economy. This chapter examines the differences between entrepreneurs in quadrants 1 
and 2 of figure 1.1 that help to explain and predict which entrepreneurs operating in an informal 
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institutional environment are likely to exit the informal economy. Specifically, this study 
develops theory concerning how an entrepreneur’s motivation for starting a business and level of 
education can influence the likelihood of registration. It then posits that firms operating as a 
family business can accrue specific advantages (e.g., relational governance) that can lead to 
lower reliance on formal institutions, which may lead to a lower likelihood of registration.  Next, 
it develops theory on how the entrepreneur’s strategic decision to cross institutional boundaries 
may increase institutional pluralism and transaction cost hazards leading to a greater likelihood 
of registration.  
These ideas are empirically examined using a sample of 2,009 entrepreneurs operating in 
an urban slum in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.  Urban slums represent an informal institutional 
environment and are prevalent around the world (Gras & Nason, 2015).  It is estimated that there 
are more than 200,000 slums across the world containing over one billion people (Davis, 2006). 
According to estimates by the UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) the number 
of slum-dwellers is expected to double to over two billion by the year 2030 (UN-HABITAT, 
2003). How to manage and improve urban slums represent one of the biggest policy challenges 
facing cities throughout the world yet remains largely unexamined by management scholars 
(Ginther & McGahan, 2015; McGahan, 2012; Sclar, Garau, & Carolini., 2005; Sudhinaraset, 
Ingram, Lofthouse, & Montagu, 2013).  
To date, large datasets are uncommon in informal economy research due to limitations on 
identifying and accessing entrepreneurs that operate informally (Bruton, 2010; Bruton et al., 
2013). Consequently, empirical findings on the informal economy “remain tentative because 
they derive from only a small number of surveys and relatively small samples” (Williams & 
Nadin, 2010: 371). The data used in this study derive from a community survey of entrepreneurs 
 
 
79 
 
in the urban slum of Manguinhos in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The survey was administered door by 
door by a third party on behalf of the state government of Rio de Janeiro to assist in identifying 
and evaluating the entire population of entrepreneurs in the community. As such, this study 
provides a unique and rich understanding of an important and understudied context and avoids 
potential biases in sample selection, which is difficult to minimize in informal economy research 
because entrepreneurs operating informally may be unwilling to acknowledge that they are 
operating illegally (Bruton, Ireland, & Ketchen., 2012; Godfrey, 2011; London & Hart, 2011; 
McGahan, 2012).  
Currently, entrepreneurs in Rio de Janeiro’s urban slums operate almost exclusively in 
the informal economy; however, a small percentage of entrepreneurs (~ 7%) are registered 
(Quadrant 2) (EGP-Rio, 2010). The fact that some entrepreneurs choose to operate as a 
registered business within these urban slums, an almost entirely informal institutional 
environment, is puzzling and provides a good context to examine the attributes and strategic 
behavior between registered and unregistered entrepreneurs that may help to explain and predict 
an entrepreneur’s exit out of the informal economy and into the formal economy through 
registration. This study makes several contributions to different streams of literature on the 
informal economy. First, it contributes to current theorizing on the informal economy by 
showing that agency and motivation oriented explanations are particularly relevant in informal 
economy research in informal institutional environments where the structuralist perspective on 
the informal economy has largely assumed that unregistered entrepreneurs are forced into the 
informal economy out of necessity and concerns for survival (Castells & Portes, 1989).  
Empirical findings in this study illustrate that entrepreneurs’ start-up motivations and strategies 
are quite heterogeneous and point to the need for greater attention and theorizing on the 
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heterogeneous nature of start-up motivations and strategies in less developed contexts (Bruton et 
al., 2013). This study also adds to the institutional perspective by showing that the interaction 
between entrepreneurs and their clients and suppliers from different institutional environments 
may influence the likelihood of registration (Webb et al., 2009a; Webb et al., 2013). 
Specifically, this study finds that crossing institutional boundaries to interact with clients or 
suppliers increases the likelihood of registration even after controlling for the level of difficulty 
the entrepreneur faces from government oversight and regulation.  
In the following sections specific hypotheses are developed on the likelihood of 
registration and then empirically examined using logistic regression analysis. After controlling 
for a variety of variables across different levels of analysis and performing robustness checks, 
the hypotheses developed in this study are largely supported. The study concludes with a 
discussion of the empirical results, implications for current theory and policymakers, and 
potential avenues for future management research. 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Start-up Motivation 
A large body of research in entrepreneurship has focused on understanding the extent to 
which personal attributes of the entrepreneur influence the identification, evaluation, and 
exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities and their associated performance outcomes. 
Research suggests that an entrepreneur’s motivation for starting a business is a salient attribute 
that influences behavior and how the entrepreneur navigates the entrepreneurship process 
(Shane, et al., 2003). While the stages of the entrepreneurship process of identification, 
evaluation, and exploitation are the same for registered and unregistered entrepreneurs, the 
nature and timing of activities, access to resources, and incentives of the entrepreneur may vary 
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considerably based on whether the entrepreneur remains unregistered and whether the 
entrepreneur navigates the entrepreneurship process in a formal or informal institutional 
environment (Bruton et al., 2013; Webb et al., 2013; Williams & Nadin, 2010). Institutions 
either facilitate or hinder the entrepreneur’s ability to navigate each stage of the entrepreneurship 
process (Shane, 2000; Sine & David, 2010). At the earliest stage of the entrepreneurship process 
institutions influence an entrepreneur’s alertness to entrepreneurial opportunities as 
entrepreneurs are less likely to identify or be alert to the entrepreneurial opportunities that formal 
institutions define as illegal or informal institutions consider as illegitimate (Webb, Kistruck, 
Ireland, & Ketchen, 2009b).  Institutions not only influence the entrepreneur’s alertness to 
opportunities but also the entrepreneur’s ability to acquire and leverage resources to exploit 
entrepreneurial opportunities effectively and to grow the business (De Soto, 2000; Godfrey, 
2015; Webb & Ireland, 2015). Taken together, this research suggests that the entrepreneur’s 
decision to register is driven by two overarching concerns: (1) the need to obtain legitimacy and 
other intangible benefits (e.g., trust, reputation), and (2) to more efficiently navigate the 
entrepreneurship process by gaining access to tangible benefits (e.g., credit, property rights, 
training) from formal institutions for which informal institutions often cannot act as an efficient 
substitute (Kimura, 2011; Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, & Ireland, 2011; Lam & Paul, 2013; 
Odegaard, 2008; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Sutter, Webb, Kistruck, & Bailey, 2013). (See 
Table 4.1 for a list of potential benefits associated with registration for both the entrepreneur and 
government). 
 
While both efficiency and legitimacy concerns may be present at the same time, informal 
economy research is unclear concerning which concern dominants the entrepreneur’s registration 
decision and under what conditions. Entrepreneurs operating in informal institutional 
 
 
82 
 
environments characterized by formal institutional voids (e.g., lack of property rights, access to 
credit, public infrastructure) (Webb, Ireland, & Ketchen, 2014) may seek to register their 
businesses in order to more efficiently navigate the entrepreneurship process independent of their 
concern for legitimacy and pressures from formal institutions. Yet, despite ample empirical 
findings that support a relationship between the entrepreneur’s motivation for starting a business 
and efficient behavior, little is known about this relationship in the context of the informal 
economy and lesser developed institutional contexts.  To date, informal economy research from a 
structuralist or institutional perspective that explains the rise of marginalized communities has 
largely conceptualized entrepreneurs in such environments as a homogenous group of necessity-
driven entrepreneurs who start businesses due to no other employment opportunities or because 
they cannot comply with regulatory requirements (Castells & Portes, 1989; De Soto, 1989, 
2000). Consequently, little is known about the heterogeneous motivations of entrepreneurs in 
less developed contexts and their relationship to the entrepreneurship process and business 
registration (Skousen & Mahoney, 2015). Scholars working within less developed contexts have 
long recognized the diverse nature and motivations of entrepreneurs in such contexts; however, 
there has been little research that has examined how such variation in motivations leads to the 
exit out of the informal economy through registration.   
This study follows prior research in conceptualizing an entrepreneur’s start-up motivation 
by distinguishing between opportunity and necessity-driven entrepreneurship (Reynolds, et al., 
2001), also referred to as push and pull factors for starting a business.  Although, the 
nomenclature may differ, there is general consensus that necessity-driven entrepreneurs are 
considered to be motivated mainly by push factors, while pull factors form the basis of 
opportunity-driven entrepreneurs (Verheul, Thurik, Hessels, & van der Zwan, 2010). Prior 
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research has used this categorization as an antecedent to specific entrepreneurial behavior and/or 
performance outcomes (Amit & Muller, 1995; Hakim, 1989; Kirkwood, 2009; Schjoedt & 
Shaver, 2007; Shapero & Sokol, 1982).  Push factors refer to the conflict between one’s current 
and one’s desired occupational status that may push an individual into starting a business 
(necessity-based entrepreneurship) when other alternatives to achieve an individual’s desired 
outcomes are unavailable.  Common examples of push factors include unemployment and 
dissatisfaction with current employment. Pull factors refer to the entrepreneur’s expectation of 
potential awards and being better off by starting a business. Examples of pull factors include 
autonomy, independence, need for control, and social status (Bhola, Verheul, Thurik, & Grilo, 
2006; Uhlaner & Thurik, 2007).   
To date comparative studies that have considered motivation as an antecedent to 
entrepreneurial behavior have disregarded the registration status of the entrepreneur. This is 
largely due to limitations on identifying and accessing entrepreneurs that operate informally 
(Bruton, 2010; Bruton et al., 2013). Current estimates suggest that informal activity represents 
between 40 to 60 percent of GDP in many emerging economies (Schneider, 2002, 2005). Thus, 
our current understanding of differences between registered and unregistered entrepreneurs and 
their economic and social implications remains limited. Recent studies in nascent 
entrepreneurship (e.g., PSED and GEM studies) tend to include the registration status of nascent 
entrepreneurs; however, this does not capture the essence of the informal economy as nascent 
entrepreneurs that participate in such surveys are generally in the process of formalizing their 
business without the intent of operating in the informal economy.  
While differences in motivations between registered and unregistered entrepreneurs 
remains understudied, research has shown that push and pull motivations for starting a business 
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tend to influence how entrepreneurs navigate the entrepreneurship process (Shane, Locke, & 
Collins, 2003).  For example, entrepreneurs motivated by pull factors are associated with higher 
growth ambitions, risk tolerance, confidence to overcome obstacles, and a lower fear of failure 
compared to entrepreneurs driven by push factors (Bhola, Verheul, Thurik, & Grilo, 2006; 
Morris, Miyasaki, Watters, & Coombes, 2006).  As a result, entrepreneurs motivated by pull 
factors tend to be financially more successful than entrepreneurs motivated by push factors 
(Amit & Muller, 1995). However, recent research suggests that necessity-based entrepreneurs 
may share some common characteristics of opportunity-based entrepreneurs such as a desire to 
maintain and even to increase income (Hessels et al., 2008). Thus, recent studies have begun to 
distinguish a subset of opportunity-motivated entrepreneurs into improvement-driven 
entrepreneurs who seek to increase their independence and autonomy, or their personal income 
but are not pushed into entrepreneurship or considered to be necessity-based entrepreneurs 
(Bosma et al., 2011; Stephan et al., 2015). 
 In sum, research on entrepreneurial motivation suggests that entrepreneurs who are 
driven by opportunity, including improvement-driven entrepreneurs, are more likely to seek 
productivity and efficiency gains compared to entrepreneurs driven by necessity. As registration 
provides entrepreneurs with better access to formal institutions that can enhance both 
productivity and efficiency, entrepreneurs driven by opportunity are expected to be more likely 
to register.   
Hypothesis 1a: Opportunity-driven entrepreneurs are positively associated with the likelihood of 
registration. 
Hypothesis 1b: Improvement-driven entrepreneurs are positively associated with the likelihood 
of registration. 
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Human Capital  
Entrepreneurship research also suggests that an entrepreneur’s level of human capital 
may be a key indicator of the entrepreneur’s ability to successfully identify, evaluate, and exploit 
entrepreneurial opportunities (Baum, Locke, & Smith, 2001; Chandler & Hanks, 1994; Shane, 
2000). Human capital refers to “the skills and knowledge that individuals acquire through 
investment in schooling, on-the-job training, and other types of experience” (Unger, Rauch, 
Frese, & Rosenbusch, 2011: 343). Human capital theory (e.g., Becker, 1962, 1964; Schultz, 
1961) suggests that entrepreneurs who have a greater stock of knowledge will have greater 
cognitive ability which will lead to more productive and efficient activity (Block & Sandner, 
2009). Hence, individuals with more knowledge or with a higher quality stock of knowledge are 
posited to be better at perceiving and exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities than are 
individuals with less human capital (Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Shane, 2000).  Unger et al.’s 
(2011) meta-analysis finds empirical support that further corroborates the positive relationship 
between human capital and entrepreneurial performance. 
In the context of less developed institutional settings, human capital also plays a key role 
in sense making. Entrepreneurs in such settings deal with various sources of institutional 
ambiguity between legal rules and enforcement capabilities by government agencies and 
informal institutions that act as substitutes for formal institutions (Webb, et al., 2013).  As 
entrepreneurs seek to more effectively navigate the entrepreneurship process they will become 
more aware of institutional pluralism and competing pressures between formal and informal 
institutions (De Castro et al., 2014). Further, higher levels of human capital have been shown to 
lead to greater willingness to engage with surroundings, to search for new products or vendors, 
and transact with unfamiliar exchange partners (Kintgen, Kroll, & Rose, 1988; London, Esper, 
Grogan-Kaylor, & Kistruck, 2014; Rosa & Viswanathan, 2007).  Thus, higher levels of human 
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capital suggest that entrepreneurs in informal institutional environments will have greater 
capacity to understand formal institutions and registration requirements.   
 While the concept of human capital is multi-dimensional in nature, the current study 
focuses on the entrepreneur’s education level as a key measure of productivity-enhancing human 
capital, which has been shown to be positively related to entrepreneurial performance (Murphy, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1991). Given that higher levels of education have been shown to be 
associated with more productive and efficient activity, and sense making of the institutional 
environment, entrepreneurs with higher levels of education are expected to be more likely to 
register.  
Hypothesis 2: As the entrepreneur’s level of education increases, the entrepreneur is more likely 
to register. 
Family Business 
In addition to the personal attributes of the entrepreneur, ownership structure may be a 
salient predictor of registration. Recent management research posits that the informal economy is 
supported by groups of individuals sharing a collective identity upon which the entrepreneur can 
derive support and access to resources (Webb et al., 2009a). One way in which entrepreneurs can 
benefit from such groups is to operate as a family business. Family business is a common 
ownership structure in the informal economy. However, it is difficult to define a family business 
operating in the informal economy based on legal ownership agreements as is generally done in 
family business research in the formal economy or more developed institutional contexts 
(Khavul, Bruton, & Wood, 2009).  In this research, a family business is defined as a business that 
is owned solely by family members or in the case where there is only one owner the owner 
employees family members and considers the firm to be a family business.   
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In the family business research literature, studies submit that family businesses have 
characteristics that differentiate them from non-family businesses and that such differences allow 
family businesses to accrue specific advantages compared to non-family businesses (Astrachan, 
2010; Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Moores, 2009). For example, family businesses have the 
advantage of implicit contracting that can be enforced through informal control mechanisms such 
as creating a culture of compliance or clan like behavior to reduce agency and monitoring costs 
(Daily & Dollinger, 1991; Kotey, 2005; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Other 
research studies show that family businesses tend to have a longer-term orientation as family 
business owners are particularly interested in the collective welfare of family members and the 
stability and longevity of the business (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006; Miller & Le Breton-
Miller, 2006; Roberts, 1994).  Collectively, these advantages often lead to higher levels of trust 
within family businesses compared to non-family businesses (Zahra, Hayton, Salvato, 2004).  
The extant research on family business suggests that the distinguishing features of family 
businesses have an important influence on how family businesses navigate the entrepreneurship 
process.  For example, studies show that family businesses exhibit lower risk propensities, which 
leads to lower use of high growth strategies and entrepreneurial orientation (Dertouzos, Lester, & 
Solow, 1989; Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjoberg, & Wiklund, 2007). Other studies have shown that 
family businesses differ in their resource accumulation strategies.  In the context of the informal 
economy in Africa, Khavul et al., (2009) found that unregistered family businesses rely more 
heavily upon family resources to fund their businesses therefore requiring less dependence on 
outside forms of capital. Similarly, Dyer and Mortenson (2005) found that family businesses 
operating in a hostile economic environment in Lithuania were more successful than non-family 
businesses due to their ability to draw on family resources including both human and financial 
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capital. These findings indicate that access to family resources may increase the family business’ 
ability to survive and compete particularly in institutional environments that lack well-
functioning formal institutions (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Webb & Ireland, 2015). Thus, family 
businesses are expected to be less likely to register compared to non-family businesses as family 
businesses tend to rely less on formal institutions as a control mechanism and have greater access 
to alternative resources in informal institutional environments. As a result, family businesses 
may be less likely to seek the benefits that formal institutions offer through registration 
compared to non-family businesses. 
Hypothesis 3: Family businesses are negatively associated with the likelihood of registration. 
Crossing Institutional Boundaries 
The central tenet of recent management research on the informal economy is the concept 
of legitimacy and on the institutions that confer it that ultimately explains the rise of the informal 
economy. This argument is articulated by the recently advocated definition of the informal 
economy as “economic activities that are outside of formal institutional boundaries (i.e., illegal) 
yet fall within informal institutional boundaries (i.e., legitimate)” (Webb, Ireland, & Ketchen, 
2014: 3). Notably, this definition of the informal economy marks a clear distinction between 
formal and informal institutions, which is a defining feature of the institutional perspective. From 
an institutional perspective, legitimacy is not a commodity but rather “a condition reflecting 
perceived consonance with relevant rules and laws, normative support, or alignment with 
cultural-cognitive frameworks” (Scott, 2008: 59-60). The entrepreneur’s concern to obtain 
legitimacy from others can rest among a variety of different groups that can range from the 
broader society to smaller groups that share a collective identity (Bruton, et al., 2012). 
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In informal institutional environments economic activity is largely governed by informal 
institutions and the institutional boundaries between formal and informal institutional 
environments are often clearly distinguishable. Godfrey (2011) maintains that the informal 
economy is highly influenced by the entrepreneur’s interaction with and perceptions of formal 
institutions. As a consequence the entrepreneur’s decisions of where to locate the business, with 
whom to interact, and the type of entrepreneurial opportunity the entrepreneur pursues have 
important strategic implications for the unregistered entrepreneur. If unregistered entrepreneurs 
decide to cross institutional boundaries into a more formal institutional environment they 
encounter a different set of institutionalized rules, norms, and expectations about registration and 
the legitimacy of the informal economy.  Such differences lead to increased institutional 
pluralism and pressures to formally adopt business practices that are consistent with their clients 
and suppliers in order to obtain legitimacy (De Castro et al., 2014; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Webb et al., 2009a). Further, if unregistered entrepreneurs are detected by the government they 
have the potential to be shut down or severely penalized (Webb et al., 2013). The likelihood of 
government detection may be influenced by how visible and accessible the business is to formal 
institutions (Scott, 2013; Scott & Haseki, 2015; Venkatesh, 2006). Unregistered entrepreneurs 
operating their businesses within their own homes or outside of the home without a physical 
store front (e.g., door-to-door salesman or street vendor) may limit their detection and pressure to 
comply with formal institutions; however, it may also reduce their ability to efficiently exploit 
entrepreneurial opportunities and grow their businesses.  For example, entrepreneurs operating in 
the home may have limited ability to openly market their product and services and instead must 
rely more heavily upon word of mouth marketing (McPherson & Liedholm, 1996).   
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In addition to encountering a different set of institutionalized rules and norms, crossing 
institutional boundaries may lead to significant transactional hazards and problems associated 
with weak bargaining positions. In the case of less developed contexts where specialized assets 
may be low and transactions are generally small, carried out in cash, and occur more frequently, 
switching costs associated with changing suppliers may still be relatively high as unregistered 
firms are resource constrained and may have neither sufficient capital nor ability to rely on 
formal institutions to rectify transactional disputes (Fairbourne, Gibson, & Dyer, 2007; Godfrey 
& Jensen, 2015). Because the informal economy relies heavily on trust between exchange 
partners to overcome formal institutional voids and is supported by social networks that consider 
illegal activity legitimate, the costs of searching for and switching to a new network may be 
costly (Lyon, 2000; Rivera-Santos & Rufin, 2010; Webb, et al., 2009a). Such costs may be 
particularly relevant in less developed contexts as transactions occur more frequently and 
research has shown that repeated transactions lead to greater embeddedness within social 
networks (Uzzi, 1996). In many cases, only a few suppliers may be willing to work with 
unregistered entrepreneurs and therefore entrepreneurs may be limited to suppliers within their 
informal networks (De Soto, 2000). Consequently, unregistered entrepreneurs may subject 
themselves to the costs associated with small numbers bargaining leading to strategic 
vulnerability as the supplier can engage in opportunistic pricing and other opportunistic 
behavior. For example, entrepreneurs seeking financing may seek capital from risky loan sharks 
that often engage in predatory lending practices and charge exorbitant interest rates (Kistruck, et 
al., 2011). 
While transactions that occur outside of government oversight can often be classified as 
pure market exchanges, the specifics of the transaction are largely governed by the firms with the 
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stronger bargaining position of the two firms, which allows them to also extort the majority of 
economic rents (Chen, 2007; Hall, Matos, Sheehan, & Silvestre, 2012; Kistruck et al., 2011). 
This phenomenon places unregistered firms at a significant disadvantage and subject to 
substantial transaction cost hazards, which may take the form of enforcement, monitoring, 
negotiation and searching costs to correct a transaction with suppliers that did not comply with 
ex ante or ex post expectations (Kistruck, Beamish, Qureshi, & Sutter, 2013). Taken together, it 
is expected that these hazards may be amplified as unregistered entrepreneurs cross institutional 
boundaries to more formal institutional environments because they will tend to have limited 
access to formal institutions and must rely upon firms that have a stronger bargaining position. 
To help mitigate such hazards, entrepreneurs that cross institutional boundaries are expected to 
have a greater incentive to register their businesses relative to those that do not cross institutional 
boundaries. In summary, the preceding arguments suggest a positive relationship between 
crossing institutional boundaries and the likelihood of registration.  
Hypothesis 4a: Entrepreneurs who cross from informal institutional environments to a more 
formal institutional environment to sell goods and services are positively 
associated with the likelihood of registration. 
Hypothesis 4b: Entrepreneurs who cross from informal institutional environments to a more 
formal institutional environment to buy goods and services are positively 
associated with the likelihood of registration. 
Institutional Voids 
A fundamental argument of the institutional perspective is that entrepreneurs in less 
develop contexts may be unable to participate in the formal economy because of formal 
institutional voids – “situations where institutional arrangements that support markets are absent, 
weak, or fail to accomplish the role expected of them” (Mair & Marti, 2009: 419). The presence 
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of institutional voids may hinder the entrepreneur’s ability to garner sufficient resources and 
capabilities to gain access to formal institutions. As noted by Webb et al., (2009b), less 
developed contexts tend to have no formal capital markets, high information asymmetry in labor 
markets, undependable and inadequate public infrastructure, weak contracts and enforcement, 
and weak property rights protections. Under such conditions, socioeconomic activities are 
governed by informal institutions and informal governance mechanisms (e.g., norms, values, 
reputation, family and social ties) (Webb et al., 2009a).  Yet, informal institutions may vary in 
their ability to act as an efficient substitute for formal institutions in an effort to offset the 
negative effects associated with formal institutional voids (Helmke & Levitsky, 2003). Thus, 
specific institutional voids may have a stronger relationship with the likelihood of registration 
relative to others.  
  While institutional voids may have a direct negative effect on the likelihood of 
registration, the focus of this study is on the strategic behavior of entrepreneurs and their 
relationship with registration. The level of difficulty that an entrepreneur has with institutional 
voids may hinder his or her ability to venture outside of informal institutional environments. 
Thus the level of difficulty with institutional voids may moderate the positive effect of 
entrepreneurs crossing institutional boundaries on the likelihood of registration by weakening the 
relationship.  Entrepreneurs that cross institutional boundaries may gain access to better 
resources and develop capabilities that may help compensate for institutional voids. However, if 
the entrepreneur is facing significant challenges due to institutional voids it may be unlikely that 
the positive effects of crossing institutional boundaries may be realized by the entrepreneur. The 
underlying assumption of research on institutional voids is that weak or absent institutions 
hinders the ability of entrepreneurs to garner resources to comply with formal institutions 
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(Chakrabarty & Bass, 2013; De Soto, 1989, 2000; Mair, Marti, & Ventresca, 2012; Webb & 
Ireland, 2015). Therefore, it is expected that the higher level of difficulty associated with 
institutional voids will weaken the relationship between crossing institutional boundaries and the 
likelihood of registration.  The preceding arguments can be summarized into the following 
hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 5: Institutional voids are negatively associated with the likelihood of registration. 
Hypothesis 6: The effect of crossing institutional boundaries on the likelihood of registration 
will be weaker when institutional voids are higher. 
 
Figure 4.1 displays a summary of the proposed relationships. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
The data used in this study derive from a community survey of entrepreneurs in the urban 
slum of Manguinhos in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Logistic regression analysis was used to predict 
the likelihood of registration given that the dependent variable (formal) in this study is 
dichotomous. The survey was performed by a third party administrator on behalf of the state 
government of Rio de Janeiro to assist in identifying and evaluating the entire population of 
entrepreneurs in the community. The survey was administered door by door by trained 
employees during the period July 2008 to April 2009. A total of 2,833 entrepreneurs were 
identified.  Of this total, 57 refused to participate in the survey and 61 were unable to be 
contacted. For those entrepreneurs that were unable to be contacted, survey administrators made 
an attempt to visit them on three different occasions on different days and times in an effort to 
have them participate in the survey.  The total number of entrepreneurs that completed the survey 
was 2,715 representing 95.8% of the total population of entrepreneurs identified. The responses 
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were analyzed and subsequently verified in the field on approximately 20% of the respondents to 
ensure validity. For purposes of this study, businesses that were associated with the government 
or operated as a not-for-profit (a total of 98 businesses) were excluded resulting in an available 
sample size of 2,617. After removing missing responses, which tend to be high in impoverished 
settings (Gras & Nason, 2015), the total sample size was 2,009 businesses.  
Variables 
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable in this study is a dichotomous response 
variable to the survey question of “is your business formal or informal?” Formal is defined as a 
business that is registered with the government. A binary variable was set to “1” if the business 
was registered and to “0” if otherwise.  
Explanatory Variables. Motivation was measured based on the entrepreneur’s response 
to the question, “why did you start the business?” Consistent with prior literature on 
entrepreneurial motivation, this study distinguishes between opportunity-driven, improvement-
driven, and necessity-based entrepreneurship. Dummy variables were created for each group. 
Opportunity-driven entrepreneurs were set to “1” if the motivation for starting the business was 
because the opportunity emerged. Improvement-driven entrepreneurs were set to “1” if the 
entrepreneur started the business to achieve greater independence/autonomy or to increase 
income but not out of necessity. Necessity-based entrepreneurs serve as the reference group and 
were coded as “1” if the entrepreneur started the business because they were unemployed or 
other necessity-based reason listed by the entrepreneur. Education was measured as a continuous 
variable based on the level of formal education obtained, ranging from “1” (no formal schooling) 
to “8” (attended university). Family business was measured based on the entrepreneur’s response 
to the question, “is your business considered a family business, non-family, or mixed?” 
Businesses that operated as a family business were coded as “1” and set to “0” if otherwise.   
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Crossing institutional boundaries was measured based on whether the entrepreneur 
crossed institutional environments to exchange goods and services with clients and suppliers. 
The location of clients and suppliers was each coded as a continuous variable where clients and 
suppliers located within Manguinhos were set to “1”, in adjacent neighborhoods outside of 
Manguinhos to “2”, in the city outside of adjacent neighborhoods to “3”, and outside of the city 
limits of Rio de Janeiro to “4”.  The use of a continuous measure of crossing institutional 
boundaries is conceptually accurate. Manguinhos is surrounded by adjacent neighborhoods (e.g., 
Benfica, Bonsucesso, Higienopolis, Jacarezinho) that are less developed compared to other more 
affluent neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro (e.g., Zona Sul, City Center, etc.), which justifies the 
use of a continuous measure of crossing institutional boundaries. 
Several measures of institutional voids were created that measure the degree of difficulty 
that entrepreneurs encounter as a consequence of institutional voids. Such voids may be an 
important indicator of whether an entrepreneur has the ability to register. Each measure of 
institutional voids is based on the entrepreneur’s response to the question of what is the level of 
difficulty the entrepreneur has with a specific institutional void. Responses ranged on a scale 
from “High” to “Not Applicable”. Responses were coded on a 4-point scale where High = “3”, 
Medium = “2”, Low = “1” and Not Applicable = “0”. Responses for those entrepreneurs that 
responded “Did Not Know” were coded as “0”.  
Finance voids represent the absence or lack of quality financial markets.  This study 
focuses on the ability of the entrepreneur to access credit. This measure is captured by the 
entrepreneur’s response to the question, “what is the level of difficulty to access credit?” 
Infrastructure voids represent the absence or lack of quality public infrastructure. The 
entrepreneur was asked a separate question for the level of difficulty with each of the following 
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types of infrastructure: electricity, water and telecommunication. An aggregate score was created 
by combing each response to measure the overall difficulty with infrastructure voids. Labor 
voids represent the absence of skilled labor in the community. This measure is captured by the 
entrepreneur’s response to the question, “what is the level of difficulty to find skilled/qualified 
labor in the community?” Market voids represent the absence of well-functioning exchange 
markets. This study focuses on the general market conditions of the entrepreneur’s customers. 
This measure is captured by the entrepreneur’s response to the questions, “what is the level of 
difficulty with the economic conditions of clients?” and “what is the level of difficulty of having 
few customers?” An aggregate score was created combing each response to measure the overall 
difficulty with market voids. These measures for institutional voids represent indicators of 
community-specific institutional conditions. They are measured at the firm-level yet represent 
the firm’s perceptions of the institutional environment of the community in which they operate. 
Control Variables. A number of control variables spanning different levels of analysis 
were included in the regression analyses that could potentially influence the likelihood of 
registration. At the individual-level, controls were created for the entrepreneur’s age and gender. 
The entrepreneur’s age was coded as a continuous variable in number of years. Research on 
gender in the context of informal economy suggests that female entrepreneurs tend to operate at 
lower levels of organization and scale, without a formal space to operate, and to not separate 
work from their household (Williams & Gurtoo, 2011). As such, this study controls for potential 
gender differences by creating a binary variable coded as “1” for male and “0” for female. 
Firm- and community-level control variables were included to proxy for the visibility of 
the firm by law enforcement/government agencies and the size of the firm.  The first measure, 
area, identifies the location of the business within Manguinhos and was coded based on the four 
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geographic areas within Manguinhos that the government uses to manage government programs. 
Each area within Manguinhos varies based on its level of economic development and 
accessibility. The area that was identified as having the greatest number of entrepreneurs (both 
registered and unregistered) was coded as “1” and the other areas were set to “0”.   The second 
measure of visibility, oversight, was measured based on the entrepreneur’s response to the 
question, “what is the level of difficulty you have with government regulation and oversight?” 
Responses ranged on a scale from “High” to “Not Applicable.” Responses were coded on a 4-
point scale where High = “3”, Medium = “2”, Low = “1” and Not Applicable = “0”. Responses 
for those entrepreneurs that responded “Did Not Know” were coded as “0”.  Third, firms 
operating in a storefront property, storefront, were coded as “1” if the entrepreneur operated in 
either an owned or rented storefront property and set to “0” if otherwise (e.g., street cart, in the 
home, door to door sales, etc.). To a certain degree, this measure also controls for the firm’s size 
as entrepreneurs that have garnered enough resources to operate in a storefront property tend to 
be bigger and more financially successful. To further control for firm size a control variable was 
created for firms that had employees. Firms with employees were set to “1” and “0” if otherwise.   
Finally, this study controls for the firm’s industry which was categorized into 14 different 
industries based on the products or services sold by the firm. 
RESULTS 
Table 4.2 displays descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the variables. The 
logistic regression results are summarized in Table 4.3. Interpretation of coefficients is based on 
the full model (Model 1). Overall, the results indicate that most explanatory variables were 
significant and consistent with the hypothesized signs. The full model had a total sample size of 
2009 entrepreneurs with a McFadden Pseudo R2 of 0.37.  
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Hypotheses 1a and 1b predicted that opportunity and improvement-driven 
entrepreneurship were positively associated with registration. As shown in Table 4.3, the 
coefficient for opportunity-driven motivation was both positive and significant at p <.001. 
However, improvement-driven entrepreneurs were not statistically different than necessity-based 
entrepreneurs. Thus hypothesis 1a was supported while 1b was not supported. Hypothesis 2 
suggested that the likelihood of registration would be positively associated with education. The 
coefficient for education was both positive and significant at p < .001 and consistent across all 
models corroborating hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 suggested that family businesses would be 
negatively associated with the likelihood of registration. Contrary to expectations, Hypothesis 3 
was not supported.  
As predicted by hypotheses 4a and 4b, crossing institutional boundaries was positive and 
significant for both clients and suppliers. Hypotheses 4a and 4b suggested that as entrepreneurs 
cross from informal institutional environments into more formal institutional environments to 
buy or sell products or services they will be more likely to register. As shown in model 1 of 
Table 4.3, the coefficients for both clients and suppliers were both positive and significant at p < 
.001 and p < .01, respectively).  Therefore support was found for hypotheses 4a and 4b.  
Hypotheses 5 predicted that institutional voids would be negatively associated with the 
likelihood of registration. As noted in the correlation matrix, measures for institutional voids 
were highly correlated. To avoid potential biases associated with multicollinearity, multiple 
regression analyses were estimated but not presented in the regression table. Finance and labor 
voids were identified as negatively associated with the likelihood of registration and statistically 
significant (p < 0.10), whereas no statistical significance was identified for infrastructure and 
market voids. These findings suggest partial support for hypothesis 5.  
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 Hypotheses 6 predicted that institutional voids may weaken the relationship between 
crossing institutional boundaries and the likelihood of registration. Models 2 and 3 introduce 
interaction effects between finance voids and clients and suppliers. Contrary to hypothesized, no 
support was found for hypothesis 6.  Additional regression analyses were performed, but not 
presented, to examine interaction effects for each measure of institutional voids. Similarly, no 
statistically significant relationships were identified. 
To test the robustness of the results and all supplemental analyses, the models were 
estimated using complementary log log (cloglog) with robust standard errors. Cloglog assumes a 
complementary log-log distribution for the errors instead of a logistic distribution and is often 
used when the outcome variable is less frequent as is the case for the dependent variable in the 
context of this study. The results from the cloglog estimations were consistent with the logistic 
regression results across the models except for the finance variable that was no longer 
statistically significant. As an additional robustness check, alternative coding was also performed 
for the family, client, suppliers, infrastructure and market variables. Rather than code family as a 
dichotomous variable, the variable was recoded as a continuous variable where Family = “2,” 
Mixed = “1,” and Non-Family = “0”. Logistic regression results with the new coding were 
consistent with those obtained for the dichotomous measure, which identified no relationship 
between family and the dependent variable. Additionally, rather than code clients and suppliers 
as a continuous variable, the variable was recoded as a dichotomous variable where 
entrepreneurs who had clients or suppliers outside of Manguinhos and adjacent neighborhoods 
were set to “1” and those cases where the entrepreneur had clients or  suppliers inside of 
Manguinhos and adjacent neighborhoods were coded as “0”. Logistic regression results with the 
new coding were consistent with the continuous measure of clients and suppliers. Finally, 
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measures for institutional voids that were aggregated (infrastructure and market voids) were 
recoded as disaggregated measures and logistic regression results remained consistent with prior 
results which found no relationship with the likelihood of registration.   
As an additional robustness check, the regression models were estimated on a second 
urban slum in Rio de Janeiro called Rocinha (n=1925; McFadden Pseudo R2: 0.18), which is 
located in a different region of the city. Rather than code clients and suppliers as a continuous 
variable, the variable was recoded as a dichotomous variable where entrepreneurs who had 
clients outside Rocinha were set to “1” and those cases where the entrepreneur had no clients or 
suppliers outside Rocinha were coded as 0. Conceptually, the recoding of clients and suppliers to 
a dichotomous variable in the case of Rocinha is appropriate. Rocinha is geographically isolated 
by large hills and mountains with highly affluent adjacent neighborhoods (Gavea and Sao 
Conrado). By contrast, Manguinhos is surrounded by lesser developed adjacent neighborhoods 
(Benfica, Bonsucesso, Higienopolis, Jacarezinho) which justify the use of a continuous measure 
of crossing institutional boundaries.  Logistic regression results with the new coding were 
consistent with those obtained for Manguinhos, however, finance was insignificant. Overall, the 
robustness checks provide further support for the relationships identified in this study. See Table 
5.2 for a summary of the results.  
DISCUSSION 
 The purpose of this study was to examine the likelihood of entrepreneurs exiting the 
informal economy through registration in the context of informal institutional environments. 
Based on theory and supportive empirical findings this study finds that a variety of antecedents 
across different levels of analysis influence the likelihood of registration. These results point to 
the increased need for more micro- and meso-level theorizing of the informal economy with 
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particular emphasis on the entrepreneurs’ individual attributes, strategic actions and 
organizational processes (Barney & Felin, 2013; Bruton, et al., 2013; Godfrey, 2011, 2015; 
Sathe & Jager, 2015).  
This study makes a contribution to both the informal economy and entrepreneurship 
literature by developing theory regarding how an entrepreneur’s startup motivation may be 
associated with the likelihood of registration. While prior entrepreneurship research has focused 
on how motivation influences entrepreneurial behavior, this study points out that startup 
motivations may be an important antecedent to the likelihood of registration and to activity in the 
informal economy in general. This study finds that start-up motivations in less developed 
contexts are quite heterogeneous in nature and that such motivations are associated with the 
likelihood of registration. The extant entrepreneurship literature suggests that opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurs compared to necessity-based entrepreneurs differ significantly in their ability to 
navigate the entrepreneurship process. The distinction between different motivations and their 
impact on the entrepreneurship process has not been adequately addressed in the context of the 
informal economy and informal institutional environments and merits further examination. In 
this study opportunity-driven entrepreneurs were separated into opportunity and improvement-
driven entrepreneurs. Recent research on entrepreneurial motivation suggests that several 
motivations can be present at the same time and that improvement-driven entrepreneurs may be 
influenced by relevant push factors normally attributed to necessity-based entrepreneurs 
(Williams & Nadin, 2010). The results in this study found that improvement-driven 
entrepreneurs were not statistically different from necessity-based entrepreneurs in their 
likelihood of registration. This finding suggests that subsets of opportunity-driven entrepreneurs 
may behave more similarly to necessity-based entrepreneurs in their decision to remain informal.  
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Lastly, although entrepreneurs driven by opportunity were more likely to register, many 
remained unregistered. This reality is consistent with recent theorizing that some entrepreneurs 
may voluntarily choose to participate in the informal economy to avoid the costs associated with 
formality (Biles, 2009, De Soto, 2000; Perry & Maloney, 2007; Uzo & Mair, 2014; Webb & 
Ireland, 2015). Future research may consider how the heterogeneity of start-up motivations 
affects each stage of the entrepreneurship process and the likelihood of registration and other 
illegal activity beyond not registering such as the use of undocumented workers, skirting health 
and environmental regulations, or not paying taxes.  
Another promising avenue for future research is to examine the ownership structure and 
agency issues of businesses within the informal economy and their influence on the likelihood of 
registration.  While unregistered entrepreneurs are often self-employed, many unregistered 
businesses have multiple owners and employees (Bruton et al., 2012). However, little is known 
about how differences in ownership structure affect the entrepreneurship process and the 
likelihood of registration in the context of the informal economy. This study limited its 
discussion to family businesses and highlighted that family businesses tend to rely more heavily 
on informal management practices and culture to minimize agency problems. Family businesses 
also tend to pursue more conservative low growth strategies and rely less on external sources of 
funding. These attributes of family businesses suggest that family businesses may be less likely 
to register. Contrary to expectations the effect of family business on the likelihood of registration 
was not supported.  Family businesses are a common form of business in the informal economy 
and comprised 33% of businesses in Manguinhos yet little is known about how family businesses 
differ from other businesses in informal institutional environments and if unregistered family 
businesses obtain similar benefits as those that are registered. Defining ownership structure is an 
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empirical challenge in informal economy research as formal ownership agreements tend to not 
be documented (Khavul et al., 2009).  This study used a self-reported measure of family business 
based on the entrepreneur’s response to the survey question, “is your business considered a 
family business, non-family, or mixed?” Future, research would benefit from creating a 
systematic way of measuring ownership structure based on specific characteristics of the 
business and the relationships between owners and employees.  Examining the ownership 
structure and how it influences each stage of the entrepreneurship process and the likelihood of 
registration will provide new insight into the underpinning mechanisms that sustain informal 
activity.  
This study also contributes to an expanding stream of research that considers the interaction 
of formal and informal institutions. Entrepreneurs operating in competing formal and informal 
institutional environments face competing values, norms, and beliefs about registration. The 
empirical findings presented in this study are consistent with a growing body of research based on 
an institutional perspective (Webb et al., 2009a).  However, this study also illustrated how the 
likelihood of registration may be partially explained by transactional hazards and the 
entrepreneur’s bargaining position based on work on resource dependence and transaction costs 
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Williamson, 1985). The complex nature of the interaction 
between registered and unregistered businesses and formal and informal institutions provides 
ample opportunities for management scholars to employ other theoretical lenses beyond 
institutional theory to examine the rise of the informal economy and an entrepreneur’s transition 
out of it (Ketchen, et al., 2014). Other theoretical perspectives that focus on the relationship 
between exchange partners and the nature of transactions (e.g., property rights theory, the resource-
based approach, resource dependence theory, and transaction cost economics) may be informative 
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lenses to explain the informal economy that to date have received little attention in informal 
economy research (Ostrom, 1990; Penrose, 1959; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Williamson, 1985).  
Several research studies (Bruton, Khavul, & Chavez., 2011; Chen, 2007; De Castro et al., 2014) 
point out that unregistered businesses interact often with registered businesses as unregistered 
businesses often rely on and even provide registered businesses with raw materials and finished 
goods.  This phenomenon suggests the need for future management research to examine how 
registered and unregistered businesses interact throughout their value chains, the nature of their 
transactions, and under what institutional context the interactions occurred. Such research will 
provide greater clarity into which overarching concern for registration (legitimacy vs. efficiency) 
dominates and when.  
This study also contributes to recent literature on institutional voids. Research on the 
informal economy suggests that the rise of the informal economy can be partially explained by 
the presence of institutional voids. The findings presented in this study suggest that the level of 
difficulty that entrepreneurs have with institutional voids may vary in their effect on the 
likelihood of registration. This study finds that finance and labor voids are negatively associated 
with the likelihood of registration. Access to credit and skilled labor significantly hinder the 
entrepreneur’s ability to accumulate resources and to grow the business.  Interestingly, as 
entrepreneurs cross institutional boundaries their difficulty associated with institutional voids did 
not appear to change as no moderating relationship between institutional voids and crossing 
institutional boundaries was identified.  These findings suggest that registration may not 
substantially improve entrepreneurs’, in less developed contexts, access to formal institutions 
(De Castro, et al., 2014; De Mel, et al., 2013). These findings raise important questions 
regarding how entrepreneurs in lesser developed institutional environments overcome 
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institutional voids and whether they face negative stigma from organizations and formal 
institutions that can assist in overcoming institutional voids.  
From a policy perspective, several of the research findings are of relevance to 
policymakers, private agencies, and not-for-profits interested in the informal economy and 
poverty. This study found that an entrepreneur’s level of education is associated with the 
probability of registration. Unfortunately, access to quality education in informal institutional 
environments such as urban slums is limited. In Manguinhos around 50% of entrepreneurs did 
not complete primary education and only 13% completed the Brazilian equivalent of high school. 
Because previous research indicates that higher levels of education lead to more productive and 
efficient behavior and better sense making of competing institutions, education policy should be 
explicitly linked to entrepreneurship policy. In many cases not-for-profit organizations, such as 
SABRAE in the case of Brazil, and social entrepreneurs have made concerted efforts to fill this 
institutional void by providing entrepreneurship education and training services to underserved 
populations. This phenomenon is gaining importance in management research and to 
policymakers yet much research remains to be done in order to understand the effectiveness of 
such organizations as substitutes for government agencies and programs.  
Also of interest to policymakers is the apparent relationship between industry and 
registration. For example, entrepreneurs operating in such industries as domestic services, 
seamstress services, confectionaries, and other basic service industries tend to not register 
compared to businesses in retail and more professional services. These findings suggest that 
entrepreneurs who exploit entrepreneurial opportunities in specific industries may be unable to 
garner enough resources or achieve scale economies sufficient to grow the business and to 
comply with the costs of registration. It is also reasonable to expect that certain industries may be 
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able to rely less on formal institutions and therefore may be less likely to seek the benefits 
associated with registration.  As such, policymakers should be aware of the diverse nature of 
businesses and adapt registration policy to be more inclusive in an effort to encourage 
entrepreneurs, weighing the costs and benefits of registration, to register their businesses.  
As previously noted, the informal economy arises, in part, as formal institutions are 
unable to provide basic services such as public infrastructure. The prominence of urban slums in 
many developing economies highlights this phenomenon. Urban slums are often characterized by 
a labyrinth of alleyways and side streets that hinder the mobility of individuals and economic 
activity. Entrepreneurs who have limited access to such streets are constrained in their ability to 
draw on resources that require transportation. A review of the data indicates that registered firms 
tend to be located at or near streets that are accessible by cars. This finding points toward the 
inherent connection between urban planning and entrepreneurship policy. This connection, 
however, has remained largely absent in entrepreneurship and policy research and provides an 
opportunity for management scholars to bridge this important research gap. 
While the empirical results provide support for many of the hypotheses developed in this 
study, this research is not without limitations. The informal economy is a broad concept and this 
study limits its discussion of the informal economy to registration even though the informal 
economy may be better conceptualized as residing on a continuum rather than being strictly 
dichotomous as either registered or unregistered.  While it is reasonable to assume that 
entrepreneurs that cross institutional boundaries will encounter different norms, values, and 
expectations about registration such differences are not explicitly measured in this study. It also 
does not identify the registration status of the entrepreneur’s clients and suppliers therefore 
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limiting the ability to measure the precise mechanisms that lead to a higher likelihood of 
registration by crossing institutional boundaries.  
 
 
Conclusion  
As the informal economy and informal institutional environments remain understudied and 
misunderstood phenomenon, management scholars are well positioned to add value to this 
relatively new stream of research. This study suggests that a variety of variables across different 
levels of analysis influence the likelihood that entrepreneurs will transition out of the informal 
economy through registration. Management research would benefit from a more micro- and meso-
level perspective that examines the individual attributes and strategic processes of entrepreneurs 
to help inform our current macro-level theorizing on the informal economy. In an effort to guide 
future research, this study outlined important research areas that need further development to 
understand how entrepreneurs navigate the entrepreneurship process in the context of informal 
institutional environments. Focusing on these topics will add new value to management research 
and assist policymakers in improving the standard of living of the billions of people that live in 
under-served conditions throughout the world.   
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TABLE 4.1: Benefits Associated with Registration  
                             Benefits to the Entrepreneur 
 
              Benefits to Government 
Intangible Benefits                    Tangible Benefits 
  
Legitimacy 
Trust 
Respect 
Reputation 
Peace of mind 
Ability to expand and grow business  
Avoidance of government penalties 
Ability to conclude legally enforceable agreements 
Access to trade fairs and export opportunities 
Access to new or lower cost sources of financing 
Ability to limit personal liability 
Access to government support programs 
Access to greater networks 
Ability to openly market goods and services 
Secure better property rights 
 Expand tax base 
Increased knowledge of economic activity 
Improved income distribution 
Improved health and safety standards 
Economic growth due to increased investment 
Increased economic efficiency gains 
Enhanced coverage of social security system 
 
 
Adapted from Jansson and Chalmers (2001) 
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FIGURE 4.1: Summary of Proposed Relationships 
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TABLE 4.2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          * Industry dummies included in analysis but not presented  
 
 
 
      Variables  Mean    S.D.      1      2    3      4      5      6    7        8        9     10     11   12     13     14     15   16    17 
1. Formal 0.04 0.19 1.00                 
2. Opportunity Driven 0.06 0.23 0.21 1.00                
3 Improvement Driven 0.31 0.46 0.04 -0.16 1.00               
4. Education 2.78 1.37 0.18 0.07 0.09 1.00              
5. Family 0.39 0.49 0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 1.00             
6. Clients 1.36 0.58 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.20 1.00            
7. Suppliers 2.01 0.68 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.21 1.00           
8. Finance 1.54 1.09 -0.01 -0.06 -0.14 0.03 0.30 -0.11 0.06 1.00          
9. Infrastructure 5.11 2.88 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 0.03 0.39 -0.10 0.05 0.71 1.00         
10. Labor 1.53 1.11 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10 0.03 0.35 -0.11 0.02 0.71 0.82 1.00        
11. Market 3.43 1.60 0.04 -0.04 -0.10 0.01 0.33 -0.10 0.04 0.68 0.72 0.70 1.00       
12. Age 41.82 13.08 0.04 0.04 0.09 -0.22 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 1.00      
13. Gender 0.43 0.50 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 1.00     
14. Area 0.55 0.50 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.42 0.12 -0.07 -0.20 -0.37 -0.34 -0.28 0.03 -0.16 1.00    
15. Storefront 0.37 0.48 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.28 -0.16 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.06 0.27 -0.22 1.00   
16. Employees 0.28 0.45 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.32 -0.07 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.19 -0.04 0.34 1.00  
17. Oversight 1.35 1.15 0.02 -0.08 -0.13 0.02 0.23 -0.10 -0.02 0.69 0.63 0.68 0.62 -0.01 0.02 -0.13 0.10 -0.02 1.00 
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   TABLE 4.3: Logistic Regression Results  
              
                Full Model          
                   Model 1           Model 2           Model 3    
        B (S.E.) Odds 
Ratio 
      B (S.E.)      B (S.E.) Corresponding 
Hypotheses 
Independent Variables               
  Opportunity Driven  1.89*** (0.39) 6.58  1.88*** (0.40)  1.88*** (0.40)  H1  
  Improvement Driven  0.40 (0.34) 1.49  0.39 (0.34)  0.39 (0.34)  H1  
  Education  0.32*** (0.09) 1.37  0.31*** (0.09)  0.32*** (0.09)  H2  
  Family  0.44 (0.33) 1.55  0.44 (0.33)  0.44 (0.33)  H3  
  Crossing Boundaries                  
     Clients  0.85*** (0.20) 2.33  0.85** (0.29)  0.85*** (0.20)  H4a  
     Suppliers  0.59** (0.19) 1.80  0.59** (0.19)  0.55† (0.29)  H4b  
  Institutional Voids                     
     Finance  -0.35† (0.19) 0.70  -0.34 (0.32)  -0.41 (0.45)  H5  
  Interaction Effects                   
     Clients X Finance      #     #   -0.01 (0.16)      # #  H6  
     Suppliers X Finance      #     #       # #  0.02 (0.16)  H6  
Control Variables               
  Age  0.02* (0.01)   0.02* (0.01)  0.02* (0.01)    
  Gender  -0.20 (0.33)   -0.16 (0.33)  -0.16 (0.33)    
  Area  0.04 (0.30)   0.05 (0.31)  0.04 (0.31)    
  Storefront  0.93** (0.36)   0.93** (0.36)  0.93** (0.36)    
  Employees  0.53 (0.33)   0.53 (0.33)  0.53 (0.33)    
  Oversight  
0.36* (0.17) 
  
0.36* (0.17) 
 
0.36* (0.17) 
   
  Industry               
     Taxi & Delivery  2.76* (1.28)   2.77* (1.30)  2.74* (1.28)    
     Bar / Restaurant  1.20 (1.13)   1.20 (1.13)  1.21 (1.13)    
     Beauty Salon  -0.51 (0.73)   -0.51 (0.73)  -0.51 (0.73)    
     Confectioner  0.46 (1.46)   0.46 (1.46)  0.46 (1.46)    
     Contractor  0.91 (1.29)   0.91 (1.29)  0.91 (1.29)    
     Domestic Services  0.93 (1.48)   0.94 (1.48)  0.93 (1.48)    
     Education & Classes  1.77 (1.20)   1.77 (1.20)  1.77 (1.21)    
     General Retail  2.50* (1.12)   2.50* (1.12)  2.50* (1.12)    
     General Services  1.89† (1.10)   1.89† (1.11)  1.89† (1.11)    
     Variety Store  1.02 (1.28)   1.03 (1.29)  1.03 (1.28)    
     Groceries / Food  2.67* (1.09)   2.67* (1.09)  2.67* (1.09)    
     Handicrafts  0.41 (1.48)   0.42 (1.49)  0.41 (1.48)    
     Professional Services  -0.55 (1.82)   -0.56 (1.83)  -0.55 (1.83)    
               
_cons  -11.01 (1.43)   -11.03 (1.50)  -10.93 (1.53)    
              
Model Significance               
  McFadden’s R2  0.37    0.37   0.37     
  N=  2009    2009   2009     
      Legend: † p < 0.10,  * p <  0.05, ** p <  0.01, ***p  <  0.001, # not included 
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CHAPTER 5: 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The objective of this dissertation was to advance current understanding of 
entrepreneurship in the informal economy. Central to research on the informal economy and 
poverty reduction is the question of what factors influence the transition or exit out of the 
informal economy. To date, research has focused on macro-level determinates (e.g., the quality 
of institutions) to explain and predict activity in the informal economy (e.g., Dau & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2014; De Soto, 1989, 2000; La Porta & Schleifer, 2008; Thai & Turkina, 2014). A 
fundamental assumption or argument in the extant research suggests that the solution to the 
informal economy and poverty resides in institutional reform that transforms or strengthens weak 
institutions into well-functioning and inclusive institutions.  However, scholars have begun to 
recognize that “the easily invoked (but fundamentally incorrect) notion of weak institutions 
provides an overly simplistic solution to a complex problem” (Godfrey, 2011: 266; Mair, Marti, 
& Ventresca, 2012). This dissertation maintains that a more micro perspective that focuses on the 
individual attributes and strategies of entrepreneurs can help explain and predict informal activity 
and the entrepreneur’s exit out of the informal economy (Barney & Felin, 2013, De Castro et al., 
2014; Skousen & Mahoney, 2015; Webb & Ireland, 2015).   
In each dissertation chapter I propose important directions for future research and discuss 
theoretical implications. I begin in chapter 1 by building a framework to distinguish between 
formal and informal institutional environments and highlight that the informal economy can 
occur in both institutional environments. This framework is illustrated in figure 1.1. In chapter 2, 
I highlight how entrepreneurship in informal institutional environments (represented by 
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quadrants 1 and 2) may be different than in more developed contexts. To date, entrepreneurship 
theory is largely based on entrepreneurship in formal institutional environments. Thus, chapter 2 
is exploratory in nature and seeks to gain an understanding of entrepreneurship in informal 
institutional environments and to identify important differences that may inform current 
management theory. I discuss how my empirical findings relate to current theory in a variety of 
different literatures (e.g., informal economy, institutions and entrepreneurship and 
entrepreneurship). Notably, entrepreneurs in informal institutional environments appear to 
exhibit fundamental differences in human capital (e.g., education, employment experience, 
industry experience, start-up experience) and entrepreneurial motivation relative to entrepreneurs 
in more developed contexts. Such differences have implications for research/theory on 
opportunity identification and exploitation (e.g., growth, persistence) (DeTienee, Shepherd, & 
De Castro, 2008; Holland & Shepherd, 2013; Shane, 2000). Future research would benefit from 
examining these differences which could provide important boundary conditions on our current 
theories and our understanding of the relationships between human capital and entrepreneurial 
motivation with entrepreneurial outcomes.   
In Chapter 3, I turn the focus to the first research question (figure 1.2) which examines 
the micro-level antecedents that influence whether an entrepreneur will cross institutional 
boundaries. I frame this research question within the broader literature on institutions and 
entrepreneurship (Sine and David, 2010) and management research on the informal economy 
(Godfrey, 2011; 2015; Webb and Ireland, 2015; Webb et al., 2009). The interaction between 
formal and informal institutions is foundational to informal economy research (Webb et al., 
2009a) and research on institutions and entrepreneurship (Eberhart, Eesley, Cheng, & Skousen, 
2015; Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009; Peredo & McLean, 2013). Yet, while this literature 
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recognizes that informal and formal institutions may not always be congruent it does little to 
explain which entrepreneurs are more likely to interact with incongruent institutions by crossing 
institutional boundaries. This dissertation contributes to these streams of research by examining 
the antecedents to crossing institutional boundaries and by distinguishing between crossing 
institutional boundaries for clients and suppliers. Findings suggest that crossing institutional 
boundaries for suppliers has a stronger statistical relationship with the independent variables. 
These findings suggest that greater friction between both formal and informal institutions occurs 
in supplier relationships relative to client relationships (Skousen & Mahoney, 2015).  
This dissertation also contributes to recent research on the institutional boundaries of the 
informal economy (Webb & Ireland, 2015) by illustrating the fluidity of institutional boundaries. 
This dissertation illustrates that the boundary between informal and formal institutional 
environments can vary significantly based on the context. For example, in the case of Rocinha, 
the boundaries are stark whereas in Manguinhos the boundaries are more gradual. This reality 
creates avenues for future research to examine with greater theoretical emphasis placed on 
institutional boundaries and the friction between competing institutions. This is represented by 
the area marked as ‘institutional boundaries’ in figures 1.2 and 1.3. This distinction is important 
because empirical results in chapter 3 suggest that family businesses are more likely to be active 
in these areas labeled ‘institutional boundaries’ but are not likely to cross beyond. As such, the 
interaction between formal and informal institutions across different points of the institutional 
boundaries may have different outcomes and require different strategies to overcome potential 
friction between competing institutions. Therefore, future research would benefit from more 
work that considers, both theoretically and empirically, the institutional boundaries between 
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formal and informal institutional environments. A summary of the findings for Chapters 3 are 
listed in Table 5.1.  
In Chapter 4, I seek to explain entrepreneurship in quadrant 2 of figure 1.1. Current 
macro-level theorizing on the informal economy does not adequately explain why entrepreneurs 
operating in an informal institutional environment would be participating in the formal economy. 
I suggest that examining more micro-level attributes of entrepreneurs and their firm strategies 
can explain and predict this phenomenon. Chapter 4 results suggest that entrepreneurial 
motivation is associated with the likelihood of registration. Based on my review, studies have not 
examined the relationship (either theoretically or empirically) of how entrepreneurial motivation 
influences the likelihood of registration. Similarly, it has not examined its relationship with 
crossing institutional boundaries (chapter 3).  In chapter 4 results suggest that opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurship is associated with the likelihood of registration. Interestingly, a similar 
relationship was not found for improvement-driven entrepreneurs, a subset of opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurs. These findings suggest that opportunity-driven entrepreneurs seek the gains 
associated with formality while improvement-driven entrepreneurs seek other forms of benefits 
(i.e., independence/autonomy) not as strongly tied to benefits associated with formality (e.g., 
growth, legitimacy, etc.) (See Table 4.1). In my discussion below on mechanisms and limitations 
I discuss these findings in greater detail. However, future research would benefit greatly from 
teasing out legitimacy vs. efficiency concerns associated with the decision to exit the informal 
economy and when one concern dominates the other.  
Turning to the other variables of interest I find that education and crossing institutional 
boundaries for clients and suppliers is positively associated with the likelihood of registration. 
These findings corroborate the argument for more micro-level research on the informal economy 
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that considers the entrepreneurs attributes and strategies. In an effort to examine whether the 
entrepreneur’s difficulty with institutional voids moderates the entrepreneur’s strategic behavior 
I empirically test whether such difficulty moderates the relationship between crossing 
institutional boundaries and the likelihood of registration. I find no empirical support for such a 
relationship. However, my findings do inform research on institutional voids. Interestingly, only 
finance and labor voids were negatively associated with the likelihood of registration. These 
findings suggest that the biggest barriers to participating in the formal economy are access to 
financing and how to resolve labor issues (e.g., contracting, training, etc.) which inhibit growth 
as the company tries to transition out of the informal economy. Research on institutional voids 
has long identified access to finance as a key factor in influencing informal economic activity 
(De Soto, 2000; Mair & Marti, 2009). However, labor voids have not been well studied in the 
informal economy literature. Future research would benefit from examining how entrepreneurs 
transition from informal contracting to formal contracting. The data in this dissertation indicate 
that many entrepreneurs have employees. As unregistered entrepreneurs transition into the 
formal economy how do they manage undocumented workers or how do they transition their 
employees into the formal economy?  What aspects of governance should remain intact or evolve 
as the firm transitions into the formal economy (Godfrey, 2011)? These are important questions 
that to date have not been adequately addressed and merit further examination. A summary of 
research findings from Chapter 4 are summarized in Table 5.2. 
Mechanisms 
While my dissertation built upon a large theoretical literature and previous empirical 
findings in developing the hypotheses, I did not directly observe the underlying mechanisms 
between some of the proposed relationships. In particular, it would be helpful to identify what 
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specific social norms and values (informal institutions) influence crossing institutional 
boundaries and how they differ between interacting with clients compared to with suppliers. In 
this section I discuss the limitations of each independent variable under consideration and 
propose future research avenues. Table 5.3 provides a summary of the mechanisms that I am 
studying in this dissertation and how they are measured.   
Entrepreneurial Motivation: My dissertation builds on literature that posits that human 
motivation influences action. There is well established literature that entrepreneurial motivation 
is a mechanism that influences the strategic behavior of entrepreneurs (Shane et al., 2003). In 
this dissertation I use a direct response from the entrepreneur on what he or she states was the 
primary reason for starting his/her business. I use the entrepreneur’s response to create three 
groups of motivation based on the literature (opportunity-driven, improvement-driven (a subset 
of opportunity-driven), and necessity-driven entrepreneurship). Each of these forms of 
motivation have been shown to influence how an entrepreneur navigates the entrepreneurship 
process (Stephan et al., 2015).  In this dissertation I use the entrepreneur’s motivation as a direct 
mechanism to build theory to suggest that an entrepreneur’s motivation will influence whether or 
not he/she crosses institutional boundaries and is more likely to register his/her firm. The 
primary limitation of this measure is that the survey instrument only identifies the primary 
motivation for starting the business. It is plausible that entrepreneurs have several motivations 
for starting a business. Provided the diversity of entrepreneurial motivation, future research 
would benefit from identifying the conditions under which different types (and combinations) of 
entrepreneurial motivations link to entrepreneurial outcomes. Based on the empirical findings it 
appears that improvement-driven entrepreneurs are willing to interact with incongruent 
institutions (cross institutional boundaries) yet they tend to not be associated with registering 
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their businesses. This suggests that they may be willing to make an attempt to grow their 
business beyond subsistence levels but that growth ambitions may taper off as they don’t seek to 
formalize their business. This suggests that improvement-driven motivation may have an 
inverted-U shape relationship with growth ambitions. On the other hand opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurs tend to be associated with higher growth ambitions. These differences highlight 
the importance for future research to better understand the individual and contextual factors 
behind growth motivations and other entrepreneurial outcomes associated with the 
entrepreneur’s motivation for starting a business. Lastly, research on entrepreneurial motivation 
indicates that motivations can change over time. An important area for future research would be 
to consider how motivations in impoverished setting evolve over time and how that influences 
the entrepreneurship process and the entrepreneur’s transition out of the informal economy.   
Education: In this dissertation I use education as a proxy for the entrepreneur’s level of human 
capital; which is a common proxy for human capital in the literature. Additionally, education has 
been empirically tied to an individual’s actions being more efficient and effective. Thus I build 
on this work to suggest that the level of the entrepreneur’s human capital (measured as level of 
education) influences the likelihood that he/she will cross institutional boundaries and and 
register his/her business.   
Family: In this dissertation the variable family represents a distinct ownership type that is 
common in informal institutional environments. I create a dichotomous measure of whether or 
not the entrepreneur considers the business a family business based on his/her response to the 
question, “do you consider your business a family business, mixed, or non-family business.” I 
argue that future research would benefit from developing a more systematic way to identify 
family businesses in informal institutional environments. The challenge arises that in less 
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developed contexts there are no legal ownership agreements, which is a common way to identify 
family businesses in more developed institutional contexts. The precise mechanisms that I am 
theorizing about in this variable are not observable. What I do is build theory based on the family 
business literature that suggests that family businesses accrue specific advantages or 
characteristics that would make them less likely to interact with incongruent institutions and rely 
less on formal institutions relative to non-family businesses. These specific advantages include 
relational governance, higher levels of trust, access to family resources (both financial and 
social), and a tendency to be more embedded within their social environments. These 
characteristics, which I do not measure directly, represent the mechanisms I am trying to 
examine in this dissertation.  
Crossing Institutional Boundaries: Two measures of crossing institutional boundaries are used in 
this dissertation. I distinguish between crossing institutional boundaries for clients and suppliers. 
These variables represent the friction, from both informal and formal institutions, which occurs 
when entrepreneurs cross institutional boundaries. I argue that it is important to distinguish 
between the two because there may be greater friction for entrepreneurs who cross institutional 
boundaries for suppliers because informal institutions will function less effectively in 
overcoming transactional hazards and entrepreneurs can’t rely on formal institutions to correct 
such hazards. Consequently, interacting with the suppliers will lead to increased transaction costs 
and weaker bargaining positions. It is important to note that while I hypothesize the same overall 
‘directional’ effects between my variables of interest and crossing institutional boundaries for 
clients and suppliers I do not suggest that they have the same effect. I specifically theorize that 
interacting with suppliers is more challenging than suppliers and that the underlying mechanisms 
for each variable are slightly different. However, a limitation of these variables is that they only 
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serve as a proxies as I do not directly measure (unobservable) the mechanisms under 
consideration. Future research would benefit from identifying a direct measure for the frictions 
that occur when exchange takes place between actors from different institutional environments 
and the contextual factors associated with the transaction (e.g., repeated transactions, size and 
type of transaction, etc.). Such measures would add clarity to how effective or ineffective 
informal institutions are in compensating for formal institutions in exchange relationships.   
Institutional Voids: Several measures are created to measure the difficulty that entrepreneurs 
have with a specific institutional void. These measures are based on a survey question that asks 
“what is the level of difficulty that you have” with a specific type of institutional void. Thus this 
measure focuses on the “level of difficulty” with a specific institutional void and is not intended 
to represent a direct measure of institutional voids. The level of difficulty and the presence of 
institutional voids can vary within the urban slums. Certain areas are more developed (have 
better electricity, plumbing, paved roads etc.) or are closer to economic exchange activity. I 
create measures for the difficulty with institutional voids for finance, labor markets, 
infrastructure, and general economic/market conditions. The focus of this dissertation is not on 
testing the relationship between the difficulty with institutional voids and the dependent 
variables. My intent is to examine whether or not the difficulty the entrepreneur faces with 
institutional voids moderates the relationship between crossing institutional boundaries and the 
likelihood of registration in Chapter 4.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this dissertation made numerous contributions to the extant literatures on 
entrepreneurship, institutions and entrepreneurship, and research on the informal economy. By 
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extending current understanding of entrepreneurship in informal institutional environments and 
shifting the focus of informal economy research from a macro to a more micro perspective, this 
dissertation has important implications to both management research/theory and to public 
policymakers across a wide variety of disciplines. While the context of this dissertation may be 
uncommon for management research, the informal economy and informal institutional 
environments are prevalent around the world and merit further examination (Bruton, 2010; 
Godfrey 2011, 2015; McGahan, 2012, Webb et al., 2009a).  As noted by Bruton (2010) and 
Williams and Nadin (2010), large data sets are rare in informal economy research. As such, this 
dissertation provides unprecedented insight into entrepreneurship and informal economy 
research and has important implications for management theory. Even though the dataset used in 
the dissertation is unprecedented it does have limitations. First, the data used in this study were 
cross-sectional. It would be useful for future research to examine how entrepreneurs and their 
firms evolve over time and to examine the sequence of events as the transition to formality is a 
process and not necessarily binary in nature. Longitudinal data which provided the sequence of 
events would also help to avoid potential endogeneity issues inherent in cross-sectional data.  
Second, as noted in my discussion of mechanisms, there are some limitations in the survey 
design that weaken the construct validity of some variables (i.e., entrepreneurial motivation and 
family business). Albeit the weaknesses in some areas, this dissertation provides several 
contributions to the literature and has identified important areas for future research that will not 
only help advance the literature but also has practical implications that can inform policymakers, 
academics, and practitioners that are interested in trying to improve the standard of living of the 
billions of individuals that live in impoverished settings throughout the world.  
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  Table 5.1: Summary of Results from Chapter 3 
 Hypotheses  Results 
      
   Manguinhos Manguinhos Rocinha 
   Ordered Logit Logistic Regression Logistic Regression 
      
Motivation    
 Hypothesis 1a: Opportunity-driven entrepreneurs are positively associated with 
crossing institutional boundaries for clients 
 Not Supported Not Supported 
 
Supported 
 Hypothesis 1b: Opportunity-driven entrepreneurs are positively associated with 
crossing institutional boundaries for suppliers 
 Not Supported Not Supported 
 
Supported 
 Hypothesis 2a: Improvement-driven entrepreneurs are positively associated with 
crossing institutional boundaries for clients 
 Not Supported Not Supported 
 
Not Supported 
 Hypothesis 2b: Improvement-driven entrepreneurs are positively associated with 
crossing institutional boundaries for suppliers 
 Supported Supported Supported 
      
Education     
 Hypothesis 3a: As the entrepreneur’s level of education increases, the 
entrepreneur is more likely to cross institutional boundaries for clients 
 Not Supported Supported Not Supported 
 Hypothesis 3b: As the entrepreneur’s level of education increases, the 
entrepreneur is more likely to cross institutional boundaries for suppliers 
 Supported Supported Supported 
      
Family Business     
 Hypothesis 4a: Family businesses are negatively associated with crossing 
institutional boundaries for clients 
 Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
 Hypothesis 4b: Family businesses are negatively associated with crossing 
institutional boundaries for suppliers 
 Not Supported Not Supported Supported 
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Table 5.2: Summary of Results from Chapter 4 
 Hypotheses  Results 
    
   
Manguinhos Rocinha 
   
Motivation   
 Hypothesis 1a: Opportunity-driven entrepreneurs are positively associated with the likelihood of 
registration 
 
Supported Supported 
 Hypothesis 1b: Improvement-driven entrepreneurs are positively associated with the likelihood of 
registration 
 
Not Supported Not Supported 
     
Education   
 Hypothesis 2: As the entrepreneur’s level of education increases, the entrepreneur is more likely to 
register 
 
Supported Supported 
 
    
Family Business    
 Hypothesis 3: Family businesses are negatively associated with the likelihood of registration  Not Supported Not Supported 
 
     
Crossing Institutional Boundaries    
 Hypothesis 4a: Entrepreneurs who cross from informal institutional environments to a more formal 
institutional environment to sell goods and services are positively associated with the likelihood of 
registration 
 
Supported Supported 
 Hypothesis 4b: Entrepreneurs who cross from informal institutional environments to a more formal 
institutional environment to buy goods and services are positively associated with the likelihood of 
registration 
 
Supported Supported 
     
Institutional Voids    
 Hypothesis 5: Institutional voids are negatively associated with the likelihood of registration  Partial  Support Partial Support 
     
Interaction Between Institutional Voids and Crossing Institutional Boundaries    
 Hypothesis 6: The effect of crossing institutional boundaries on the likelihood of registration will be 
weaker when institutional voids are higher 
 
Not Supported Not Supported 
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Table 5.3: Summary of Mechanisms 
Mechanism(s) Proxy Variable How is it Measured Limitation(s) 
Entrepreneurial Motivation Entrepreneurial Motivation Self-reported by the respondent based on the 
question, “why did you start your business? 
- No secondary motivations provided 
- Static in nature. Does not change over time 
Human Capital Education Self-reported level of education completed by 
the entrepreneur 
- Captures only one dimension of human 
capital 
Advantages that accrue to family businesses that allow for less 
reliance on formal institutions: 
- Relational governance 
- Higher levels of trust 
- Access to family resources (financial, social, etc.) 
- Tendency to be more embedded within their social 
environments 
Family Business Self-reported by the respondent on whether the 
business is considered to be a family business, 
mixed, or non-family business 
- Self-reported measure 
- No systematic way to distinguish between 
firms (e.g., legal ownership agreements) 
Friction between incongruent institutions when crossing 
institutional boundaries 
Clients Self-reported location of the entrepreneur’s 
clients 
- Not a direct measure of the mechanisms  
Friction between incongruent institutions when crossing 
institutional boundaries for suppliers:  
- Ineffectiveness of informal institutions in managing 
transactions 
- Increased transactions costs 
- Weak bargaining positions 
Suppliers Self-reported location of the entrepreneur’s 
suppliers 
- Not a direct measure of the mechanisms  
Difficulty with institutional voids Difficulty with institutional 
voids 
Self-reported level of difficulty that 
entrepreneurs has with a specific type of 
institutional void 
- Not a direct measure of institutional voids. 
Rather the focus is on how much difficulty is 
associated with a specific void 
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